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Summary / Abstract  VI 
Summary / Abstract 
The general purpose of the present neuroimaging work was to investigate the neural 
mechanisms of cognitive control that are recruited in situations of cognitive interference or 
competition. To address this issue, an oddball variant of the Stroop paradigm was created and 
applied. Thereby, participants responded to the font size of presented word stimuli by either a 
left or right button press. Nine neurologically healthy young subjects underwent functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they performed the task. Besides the neuroimaging 
data, reaction time as behavioral measure was registered and analyzed. Basically, the current 
work pursued three goals: 
(1) First, it was planned to investigate and compare the neural mechanisms of cognitive 
control that are recruited during two distinct situations (i.e. experimental conditions) of 
interference or competition between task-relevant and task-irrelevant information: (a) Stroop-
incongruity (i.e. when subjects are presented with incongruent word information assumed to 
produce Stroop-interference) and (b) oddballs (i.e. when subjects are presented with task-
irrelevant but attention-capturing low-frequency events). Thereby, in order to ensure high 
comparability, incongruity effects (i.e. Stroop-interferece) and oddball effects (i.e. oddball 
interference) should be investigated within the same processing domain, that means 
incongruent and low-frequent task-irrelevant information should occur in the same stimulus 
dimension. Accordingly, besides Stroop-incongruent trials, a ‘Word-oddball’ condition was 
created that comprised rarely occurring words, so that in both compared conditions 
interference emanated from the word dimension, including incongruent information in the one 
case and rarely occurring information in the other. Based on prior studies’ findings, the 
related hypothesis was that the neural mechanisms that underlie the resolution of Stroop-
interference (i.e. the overriding of a prepotent response tendency, in the present case to read 
and react to word meaning) are, at least in part, the same as those that underlie the processing 
of task-irrelevant low-frequency events (i.e. the overriding of an involuntary attentional 
orienting response). 
(2) Second, it was planned to elucidate domain-specific effects in interference processing. For 
this purpose, oddball events that occurred in different stimulus dimensions – corresponding to 
different processing domains – were compared to each other. Specifically, in addition to 
Word-oddballs, a Color-oddball condition comprising of rarely occurring red colored stimuli 
was created, and subsequently the two low-frequency conditions were compared to each 
other. Either oddball condition was expected to evoke an involuntary orienting response to the 
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respective dimension, either word or color, in which the oddball event occurs, which 
consequently would require subjects to reconfigure the current attentional set. 
(3) Third and finally, the current work sought to trace back Stroop-interference to the 
influence of circumscribed properties of task-irrelevant word information that can be 
conceived as “conflict factors”. In particular, it was planned to delineate the neural substrates 
of three conflict factors: (A) response-incompatibility (i.e. word identity indicates an opposed 
response), (B) semantic incongruency (i.e. word identity is semantically incongruent, i.e. 
conceptually contradictory, independent of its response-mapping), and (C) task-reference (i.e. 
word identity is semantically related to the task-set, independent of its semantic match with 
the relevant dimension). 
Generally, all interference conditions (i.e. incongruity or oddballs trials) exhibited 
substantially prolonged reaction times as compared to non-interference conditions (i.e. 
baseline trials), demonstrating that the experimental manipulation of the adopted task 
paradigm was indeed effective. Accordingly, the neuroimaging data revealed definitive 
patterns of results allowing for meaningful conclusions regarding the presented issues of this 
work. 
Ad (1) The comparison of Stroop-interference and interference emanating from Word-
oddballs revealed two distinct patterns of neural activation that exhibited only sparse overlap. 
Therefore, the data did not corroborate the expectation that the two interference effects exhibit 
a marked activation overlap that could be construed to reflect or represent a core neural 
mechanism in cognitive control. Rather, the two different activation patterns can be 
conclusively interpreted to represent two distinct and complementary (sub-)components (i.e. 
aspects or levels) of cognitive interference that refer to distinct control functions. First, the 
analyses revealed a motor component of interference that is related to Stroop incongruity or 
Stroop-interference, and that reflects the occurrence of (response-)conflict emanating from 
incongruent word meaning. Second, an attentional component was isolated that reflects the 
ability of low-frequent, task-irrelevant information to efficiently distract attentional resources 
(i.e. to evoke an involuntary orienting response to which one may refer as ‘oddball 
interference’). While the first component was associated with activity mainly in regions that 
are implicated in motor control and response preparation (comprising e.g. premotor cortices, 
the basal ganglia and cerebellum), the second component was represented by a frontoparietal 
“attention network” that most probably reflects top-down attentional control to focus on task-
relevant information (i.e. to select task-relevant over task-irrelevant information), as 
suggested by numerous studies of the cognitive neuroscience literature. 
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Ad (2) Word- and Color-oddballs exhibited a broad overlap of activations, mainly in 
prefrontal areas but also in posterior processing regions. Findings are consistent with the 
assumption that attentional selection mainly works through manipulating, i.e. boosting, 
processing of task-relevant information in posterior processing areas. Color-oddballs 
compared to Word-oddballs exhibited the stronger behavioral effect as well as stronger and 
more widespread neural activation. This latter finding may be attributed to the task context 
and to a greater inherent saliency of color compared to word information. Furthermore, in line 
with prior studies’ findings, the current data emphasized a prominent role of a region in the 
posterior lateral PFC – referred to as inferior frontal junction area (IFJA) – in implementing 
top-down attentional control. In this context, both oddball conditions of the current study 
exhibited the bilateral IFJA as one main site of activation. 
Ad (3) Finally, the ‘factorial decomposition analysis’ revealed definitive activation patterns 
related to the defined conflict factors that allowed for meaningful conclusions. Response-
incompatibility was related to activation in the left ventral premotor cortex which can be 
reasonably interpreted as indicator for or neural substrate of response conflict (i.e. motor 
competition). Semantic incongruency exhibited specific activation in the posterior 
frontomedian cortex, the bilateral insula, the basal ganglia and thalamus, as well as in the left 
postcentral gyrus corresponding to the somatosensory cortex. These activations presumably 
underlie strengthened motor control efforts to prevent false responding. Finally, task-
reference exhibited activation in the left inferior prefrontal cortex, right superior prefrontal 
cortex, and left temporo-polar cortex. Due to prior studies’ findings that relate these regions to 
semantic processing of lexical tokens, one may conclusively assume that this neural activation 
pattern underlies increased lexico-semantic processing of task-irrelevant (but task-associated) 
word information. 
The most notable feature of the current work is that it isolates subcomponents of neural 
mechanisms that underlie interference processing (i.e. interference resolution) which 
supposably have been intermingled in analyses of prior Stroop or interference studies. In 
particular, the distinction between a motor and an attentional component may contribute to a 
refined comprehension of cognitive interference and related control mechanisms. Similarly, 
the conducted factorial decomposition analysis may provide a more fine-grained 
conceptualization of Stroop-interference as it pointed to the existence of different cognitive 
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Zusammenfassung (deutsche Fassung) 
 
Untersuchung der neuronalen Mechanismen exekutiver Kontrolle in 
Situationen von kognitivem Konflikt und Kompetition unter Verwendung 
funktioneller Hirnbildgebung 
Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung war es, mittels funktioneller Hirnbildgebung die 
neuronalen Mechanismen kognitiver Kontrolle in verschiedenen Situationen kognitiver 
Interferenz bzw. Kompetition zwischen aufgabenrelevanter und aufgabenirrelevanter 
Information zu untersuchen. Zu diesem Zweck wurde ein spezielles Aufgabenparadigma, eine 
„Oddball-Variante“ der klassischen Stroop-Aufgabe, entwickelt und eingesetzt. Hierbei war 
es Aufgabe der Probanden, präsentierte Wortstimuli anhand deren Schriftgröße per (linken 
oder rechten) Tastendruck (als „groß“ oder „klein“) zu klassifizieren. Neun neurologisch 
gesunde Probanden nahmen an der Studie teil und unterzogen sich funktioneller 
Kernspintomographie (fMRT), während sie die beschriebene Aufgabe bearbeiteten. Neben 
den generierten Bildgebungsdaten, wurden die Reaktionszeiten der Probanden auf die Stimuli 
registriert und analysiert. Im Wesentlichen verfolgte die Studie folgende drei Ziele: 
(1) In erster Linie war es das Ziel, die neuronalen Mechanismen kognitiver Kontrolle in zwei 
distinkten Situationen (d.h. unter zwei distinkten experimentellen Bedingungen) kognitiver 
Interferenz zu untersuchen und miteinander zu vergleichen: (a) wenn Stroop-Inkongruenz – 
d.h. inkongruente Wortinformation von welcher angenommen wird, dass sie sog. Stroop-
Interferenz auslöst – auftritt, und (b) wenn „Oddballs“ – d.h. aufgabenirrelevante, jedoch 
saliente und daher aufmerksamkeitsablenkende Seltenheitsereignisse – auftreten. Um eine 
gute Vergleichbarkeit zu gewährleisten, sollten Inkongruenz- und Oddball-Effekte in der 
gleichen Verarbeitungsdomäne untersucht werden, d.h. inkongruente und seltene 
aufgabenirrelevante Information sollten in der gleichen Stimulusdimension dargeboten 
werden. Entsprechend wurde neben Stroop-inkongruenten Durchgängen eine sog. „Word-
Oddball“ Bedingung gebildet, die aus selten präsentierten Worten bestand. Folglich ging in 
beiden zu vergleichenden Bedingungen Interferenz von der Wort-Dimension der 
dargebotenen Stimuli aus, die im einen Fall inkongruente Information und im anderen Fall 
seltene Information beinhaltete. Aufgrund der Ergebnisse vorausgehender Studien bestand die 
Hypothese, dass die neuronalen Mechanismen, die der Lösung von Stroop-Interferenz 
(bestehend in der Überschreibung der vorherrschenden Reaktionstendenz, irrelevante 
Wortinformation zu lesen) und Oddball-Interferenz (bestehend in der Überschreibung einer 
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unwillkürlichen attentionalen Orientierungsreaktion) zugrunde liegen, (zumindest teilweise) 
sich entsprechen. 
(2) Zweitens war es geplant, den Einfluss der Verarbeitungsdomäne, in welcher Interferenz 
auftritt, zu untersuchen, d.h. es sollten mögliche domänenspezifische Effekte der 
Interferenzverarbeitung bestimmt werden. Zu diesem Zweck wurden Oddball-Ereignisse (d.h. 
Seltenheitsereignisse), die in verschiedenen Stimulusdimensionen – und entsprechend in 
verschiednen Verarbeitungsdomänen – auftreten, miteinander verglichen. Speziell wurde 
zusätzlich zu den beschriebenen „Word-Oddballs“ eine sog. „Color-Oddball“ Bedingung, 
bestehend aus selten auftretenden rotfarbigen Stimuli, realisiert, um anschließend die beiden 
Seltenheitsereignisse miteinander zu vergleichen. Von beiden Oddball-Bedingungen wurde 
erwartet, dass sie eine attentionale Orientierungsreaktion, hin zu der jeweiligen 
Stimulusdimension, in der das Seltenheitsereignis auftrat, auslösen, was eine Rekonfiguration 
der Aufmerksamkeit notwendig machen würde. 
(3) Schließlich war es das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit, Stroop-Interferenz auf den Einfluss 
umschriebener Merkmale aufgabenirrelevanter Wortinformation, die als „Konfliktfaktoren“ 
(„conflict factors“) betrachtet werden können, zurückzuführen. Speziell sollte das neuronale 
Substrat bzw. Korrelat der folgenden drei Konfliktfaktoren bestimmt werden: (A) 
Antwortinkompatibilität („response incompatibility“; heißt, dass Wortinformation eine nicht 
vereinbare oder entgegengesetzte motorische Reaktion indiziert), (B) semantische 
Inkongruenz („semantic incongruency“; heißt, dass Wortinformation in semantischem bzw. 
konzeptuellem Widerspruch steht, unabhängig von deren Reaktions-/Antwortbezug) und (C) 
Aufgabenbezug („task-reference“; heißt dass Wortinformation mit der aktuell zu 
bearbeitenden Aufgabe in semantischem Bezug steht, unabhängig von deren semantischen 
Übereinstimmung mit der aufgabenrelevanten Information). 
Allgemein zeigten alle realisierten Interferenz-Bedingungen (d.h. Inkongruenz- und Oddball-
Durchgänge) im Vergleich zu den Kontrollbedingungen erhöhte Reaktionszeiten, was die 
Wirksamkeit der experimentellen Manipulation in dem verwendeten Aufgabenparadigma 
belegt, bzw. dieses als „Interferenz-“ oder „Konflikt-Paradigma“ validiert. Entsprechend 
zeigten auch die Bildgebungsdaten plausible und aussagekräftige Ergebnisse in Bezug auf die 
vorgestellten Fragestellungen und Ziele der Untersuchung. 
Ad (1) Der Vergleich zwischen Stroop-Interferenz und Interferenz, die von Word-Oddballs 
ausgeht, zeigte zwei distinkte Aktivierungsmuster, die nur geringfügig überlappten. 
Entsprechend wurde die Hypothese, dass die beiden Interferenzeffekte eine deutliche 
Aktivierungsüberlappung aufweisen, die im Sinne eines gemeinsamen neuronalen 
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Mechanismus kognitiver Kontrolle zur Interferenzlösung interpretiert werden kann, nicht 
bestätigt. Vielmehr kann plausibel angenommen werden, dass die Aktivierungsmuster zwei 
distinkte und komplementäre Subkomponenten bzw. Aspekte kognitiver Interferenz 
widerspiegeln, die auf verschiedene neuronale Mechanismen kognitiver Kontrolle (d.h. 
Mechanismen der Interferenzlösung) rekurrieren. Erstens zeigten die Analysen eine 
„motorische Subkomponente“ von kognitiver Interferenz, die sich auf Stroop-Interferenz 
bezieht und im Wesentlichen das Auftreten von Antwortkonflikt, ausgehend von 
inkongruenter Wortinformation, widerspiegelt. Zweitens zeigten die Analysen eine primär 
„attentionale Subkomponente“ von Interferenz, die die Fähigkeit aufgabenirrelevanter 
Information, effektiv Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zu ziehen (d.h. eine attentionale 
Orientierungsreaktion auszulösen), widerspiegelt. Während die erste Subkomponente 
hauptsächlich durch Aktivierungen in Hirnarealen, die mit motorischer Kontrolle und 
Vorbereitung in Verbindung stehen (z.B. dem prämotorischen Kortex, den Basalganglien und 
dem Kleinhirn), charakterisiert war, zeigte die attentionale Subkomponente Aktivierung in 
einem fronto-parietalen „Aufmerksamkeits-Netzwerk“, das in der kognitiv-
neurowissenschaftlichen Literatur konsistent mit top-down Steuerung von Aufmerksamkeit, 
und speziell mit der Selektion aufgabenrelevanter Information, in Verbindung gebracht wird. 
Ad (2) Die Aktivierungsmuster von Word-Oddballs und Color-Oddballs zeigten eine starke 
Überlappung, die vornehmlich in präfrontalen Arealen, jedoch auch in posterioren Regionen 
der visuellen Verarbeitung auftrat. Dieser Befund ist sehr gut mit der Annahme vereinbar, 
dass Aufmerksamkeitsselektion grundlegend über Manipulation, d.h. Verstärkung, der 
Verarbeitung aufgabenrelevanter Information in posterioren Verarbeitungsregionen neuronal 
funktioniert. Color-Oddballs zeigten im Vergleich zu Word-Oddballs den deutlicheren 
behavioralen Effekt sowie eine stärkere und umfangreichere neuronale Aktivierung. Dieser 
Befund kann zum einen mit dem Aufgabenkontext und zum anderen mit einer größeren 
Salienz (d.h. Prägnanz oder Auffälligkeit) von Farbinformation im Vergleich zu 
Wortinformation erklärt werden. Ein Hauptfokus der Aktivierungen war in beiden Oddball-
Bedingungen eine Region im posterioren präfrontalen Kortex, die in früheren Arbeiten 
„inferior frontal junction“ genannt wurde. In Einklang mit früheren Studien sprechen die 
vorliegenden Ergebnisse dafür, dass diese Region eine zentrale Rolle bei der „top-down“ 
Steuerung der Aufmerksamkeit spielt. 
Ad (3) Schließlich zeigte die Analyse zur “faktoriellen Zerlegung” von Stroop-Interferenz 
Aktivierungsmuster, die aussagekräftige Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf die definierten 
„Konfliktfaktoren“ erlaubten. Antwortinkompatibilität war mit Aktivierung im ventralen 
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prämotorischen Kortex (linkshemisphärisch) verbunden, welche in diesem Zusammenhang als 
Indikator für bzw. als neuronales Substrat von Antwortkonflikt interpretiert werden kann. 
Semantische Inkongruenz zeigte spezifische Aktivierung im posterioren frontomedianen 
Kortex, im bilateralen insulären Kortex, in den Basalganglien und Thalamus sowie im linken 
postzentralen, d.h. somatosensorischen, Kortex. Es ist sehr plausibel, dass diese 
Aktivierungen mit verstärkter motorischer Kontrolle zur Vorbeugung falscher manueller 
Antworten in Verbindung stehen. Schließlich zeigte Aufgabenbezug signifikante Aktivierung 
im linken inferior-frontalen Kortex, im rechten superioren präfrontalen Kortex sowie im 
linken temporo-polaren Kortex (Temporalpol). Aufgrund zahlreicher Studien, die diese 
Hirnregionen mit lexikalisch-semantischer Verarbeitung in Verbindung gebracht haben, kann 
plausibel angenommen werden, dass dieses Aktivierungsmuster inkrementeller (d.h. 
verstärkter) semantischer Verarbeitung der aufgabenirrelevanten (jedoch aufgabenbezogenen) 
Wortinformation zugrunde liegt. 
Wesentliches Merkmal der vorliegenden Arbeit ist, dass diese verschiedene Subkomponenten 
neuronaler Mechanismen, die der Verarbeitung (d.h. der Lösung) von Interferenz zugrunde 
liegen und mutmaßlich in früheren Interferenzstudien miteinander konfundiert wurden, 
isoliert. Speziell die Unterscheidung zwischen einer motorischen und einer attentionalen 
Komponente kann zu einem verbesserten Verständnis kognitiver Interferenz und darauf 
bezogener Kontrollmechanismen beitragen. Entsprechend kann auch die durchgeführte 
Analyse zur faktoriellen Zerlegung zu einer detaillierteren und präziseren Konzeptualisierung 
von Stroop-Interferenz beitragen, da diese Evidenz für das Vorhandensein verschiedener 
Subprozesse während der Interferenzverarbeitung, die ihre distinkten neuronalen Substrate 





Introduction  1 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The subject area: executive function(s) and cognitive control 
 
1.1.1 The construct: terms and descriptions 
The term ’executive function(s)’ subsumes a class of mental activities (i.e. higher cognitive 
processes) that allow for goal-directed, intentional and flexible actions as opposed to 
reflexive, impulsive reactions to sensory information. In that, executive functions enable 
individuals to engage in independent, purposeful, and self-serving behaviors (see e.g. Barkley, 
1996, 1997; Pennington et al., 1996). The mental regulation and coordination of behavior in 
accordance with goals or intentions is also unified under the term ’cognitive control’ or 
‘executive control’ which has been conceptualized as emanating from an executive system as 
a basic neurocognitive control device or instance (e.g. Baddeley, 1986, 1990; Norman & 
Shallice, 1980). Executive control has been associated with multiple and dissociable cognitive 
processes, among the major ones are response inhibition permitting impulse control, 
attentional selection which is essential for resistance to distraction, verbal and non-verbal 
working-memory, mental calculation, and delay of gratification. 
Deficits in executive control have been classically associated with acquired damage to the 
prefrontal cortex. Baddeley (1986) coined the term ‘dysexecutive syndrome’ (DES) to 
describe dysfunctions of the central executive in patients who suffered prefrontal lesions. The 
classic frontal syndrome is characterized by attentional and comprehensional deficits, 
increased distractibility, and problems to master new types of task, i.e. to pursue goal-directed 
action in new or unexperienced situations (Rylander, 1939). In other words, patients suffering 
from DES lack flexibility and the ability to control their processing resources which becomes 
obvious in disorganized actions and strategies for everyday tasks. Important to note, more 
recent findings strongly suggest that executive dysfunctions are not specific to frontal lobe 
damage, as it may likewise arise from damage to interconnected cortical and subcortical brain 
structures or from more diffuse brain damage. 
Closely related to the concept of cognitive or executive control is the frequently used term 
“task-set”. The appropriate accomplishment of a task – i.e. the pursuit of a given behavioral 
goal – requires an adequate configuration of mental resources. The adequate mental 
configuration state has been called “task-set” or “procedural schema” (Monsell, 1996). In a 
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similar sense, the term “attentional set” comprises all cognitive representations involved in 
the attentional selection of task-relevant stimuli and/or responses (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). 
 
1.1.2 Top-down vs. bottom-up processing 
“Top-down” and “bottom-up” have become widespread expressions for two basic and 
antagonistic levels of cognition. While top-down processing comprises higher levels of 
cognitive functioning mainly corresponding to executive control (see 1.1.1), bottom-up 
processing primarily reflects lower levels of cognitive functioning mainly related to sensation 
and perception. Top-down cognitive processes are commonly described as goal- or 
conceptually driven and accordingly mainly depend on cognitive representations. Bottom-up 
cognitive processes, on the other hand, are conceived as sensory- or data-driven and 
accordingly to primarily depend on incoming perceptual information.  
Important to note, adaptive human behavior in a changing environment requires both kinds of 
cognitive processing, “top-down” and “bottom-up”, and therefore imposes antagonistic 
requirements on agents’ control system. While conceptually-driven top-down processes 
should promote attentional selection and behavioral stability, bottom-up processing should 
provide agents with behavioral flexibility and responsivity to significant changes in the 
environment that occur outside the current focus of attention. Hence, top-down and bottom-up 
processes fulfill complementary roles in the control of adaptive behavior. Taken together, 
effective cognition requires a context-sensitive “just-enough” calibration of endogenous 
control that is sufficient to protect an ongoing goal-directed action from distraction (e.g. not 
looking up at every little noise in the environment), that however does not compromise the 
flexibility allowing the rapid execution of another behavior when appropriate (e.g. when the 
sound appears to be a cry for help or a warning) (see Monsell, 2003).  
 
1.1.3 Dilemmas in cognitive control 
Thomas Goschke (e.g. Goschke, 2003) described the antagonistic requirements on action 
control – i.e. the complementary roles of top-down and bottom-up processes – during goal-
directed action in terms of two control dilemmas. 
(1) The selection-monitoring dilemma. When pursuing a certain behavioral goal, agents have 
to select task-relevant information and inhibit distracting task-irrelevant information in order 
to prevent crosstalk and interference (Allport, 1989). On the other hand, however, it would 
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not be adaptive if attentional selection operated so rigorously as to suppress irrelevant 
information completely. Rather, it is equally important to monitor the environment for 
potentially significant information, even if this information is not relevant for an ongoing 
action. This “background monitoring” attentional function is highly adaptive as it enables an 
organism to process irrelevant information to a degree that allows to recognize threats or 
opportunities outside the current focus of attention that are related to its goals and needs.  
(2) The maintenance-switching dilemma. Goals and goal-directed actions have to be 
maintained and shielded from competing responses, so as to promote behavioral stability and 
the pursuit of long-term goals (Kuhl, 1985). On the other hand, however, an organisms has to 
stay able to interrupt an ongoing action in the case of significant changes in the environment. 
For instance, people have to be capable to respond to the unexpected appearance of smell of 
burning with a fast switch from an ongoing behavior (e.g. doing crossword puzzles) to a 
totally different behavior (e.g. using a fire drencher or flight). 
 
1.2 Interference in cognitive processing: cognitive conflict and attentional 
competition 
 
1.2.1 The construct: descriptions and working definitions 
One central purpose of the executive control system is to overcome crosstalk or interference 
in cognitive processing and thereby to enable the agent to maintain adequate performance in 
the face of effective distraction (see e.g. van Veen & Carter, 2005). Accordingly, in order to 
investigate control processes, it is a major strategy to collect behavioral and neurobiological 
measures of cognitive performance during situations of interference that are construed to 
evoke the processes (i.e. the neurocognitive mechanisms) of interest. Regarding the 
experimental implementation (i.e. operationalization) of cognitive interference, different task 
paradigms have been developed (see 1.2.2). The following working definition should provide 
a theoretical conception of cognitive interference and thereby outline commonalities of 
different tasks or operationalizations of cognitive interference.  
 
Working definition: cognitive interference consists of interference from task-irrelevant 
information occurring in the attentional background on the processing of task-relevant 
information that occurs in the current focus of attention. 
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According to the given definition, to select task-relevant over task-irrelevant information – as 
an essential aspect of attentional functioning – may be thought of as core process in the 
resolution of cognitive interference. Specifically, during the resolution of cognitive 
interference or conflict, top-down attentional control provides a bias favoring the processing 
of task-relevant information over that of task-irrelevant information (see MacDonald et al., 
2000; Weissman et al., 2005). 
According to the processing level at which cognitive interference occurs, one can distinguish 
three basic kinds of cognitive interference: 
(1) Response-conflict. Response-conflict – also referred to as motor conflict – denotes 
interference at the motor level of cognitive processing, and is defined as the co-activation 
of incompatible response tendencies, or similarly, as competition between a correct and an 
incorrect response (e.g. Botvinick et al., 2001; Brown & Braver, 2005). In other words, 
during response-conflict task-irrelevant information induces incongruent, conflicting 
motor tendencies. For instance, response conflict may comprise interference between a 
required and a prepotent but inadequate response (i.e. motor action), or a stop-go conflict. 
(2) Semantic conflict. Semantic conflict, as inherent in the term itself, occurs at the 
semantic level of cognitive processing and comprises interference or crosstalk between 
simultaneously occurring diverging or incongruent (i.e. contradictory) mental 
representations. In other words, during semantic conflict task-irrelevant information 
induces incongruent, conflicting semantic representations. Important to note, conflicting 
semantic representations are not necessarily associated with incompatible motor actions so 
that semantic conflict can occur independently of motor conflict. For instance, semantic 
conflict may comprise conflict between different color representations, different shapes, 
different terms, different numbers, or other contradictory semantic units. 
(3) Competition. The term competition denotes an “early” interference effect that occurs 
at the attentional level of cognitive processing. Thereby, task-irrelevant information draws 
attentional resources away from task-relevant information, and thus competes with task-
relevant information for priority in processing (e.g. Milham et al., 2003a). As discussed by 
others (e.g. Frith, 2001; Milham et al., 2003a), the perceptual features of a task-irrelevant 
stimulus or stimulus aspect (e.g. its brightness or color) can increase its salience relative to 
a task-relevant stimulus or stimulus aspect, thereby favoring its processing and allowing 
associated representations to effectively compete for priority in processing. Noteworthy, 
during competition, task-irrelevant information interferes without necessarily being 
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incongruent at either the semantic or motor level, so that competition can occur 
independently of conflict. 
[For an experimental distinction between response-conflict and semantic conflict see e.g. van 
Veen & Carter (2005), and for a distinction between conflict and competition see e.g. Milham 
et al. (2002) and Milham & Banich (2005)]. 
The presented kinds of interference may be arranged in an hierarchical order – with response-
conflict on first place, semantic conflict on second, and competition on third/last – wherein 
“higher” interference effects comprise “lower” ones. Specifically, task-irrelevant information 
that is associated with an incompatible motor action (i.e. that induces an incompatible 
response-tendency), as a rule, is also or primarily associated with (i.e. induces) an incongruent 
semantic representation. Hence, response-conflict can be conclusively conceptualized as to 
imply semantic conflict. Similarly, to induce incongruent semantic representations, task-
irrelevant information, in the first place, has to effectively draw attention (i.e. has to interfere 
at the attentional level), so that conflict conclusively premises competition. In other (simple) 
words, if task-irrelevant information remains unnoticed, it won’t be able induce conflict. 
Whether task-irrelevant information induces (any kind of) interference or not, may be 
conclusively attributed to circumscribed properties of task-irrelevant information. 
Accordingly, in the present work, properties of task-irrelevant information that potentially 
lead to cognitive interference are conceived as so-called ‘conflict factors’. 
 
Working definition: conflict factors are properties of task-irrelevant information that 
potentially lead to cognitive interference. 
 
With the latter definition, two further assumptions are associated: 
(1) different conflict factors may lead to different interference effects, and 
(2) different conflict factors can occur simultaneously and hence may lead to different 
interference effects simultaneously. 
The current work focuses on three conflict factors: (A) response-incompatibility (denotes that 
task-irrelevant information indicates an incompatible or opposed motor response), (B) 
semantic incongruency (denotes that task-irrelevant information is semantically incongruent, 
i.e. conceptually contradictory, independent of its response-eligibility), and (C) task-reference 
(denotes that task-irrelevant information is semantically related to the task-set, independent of 
its semantic concordance with the relevant information). These conflict factors can be 
conclusively related to different interference effects. Response-incompatibility can be thought 
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to induce response-conflict whereas semantic incongruency can be construed to produce 
semantic conflict. Finally, as task-irrelevant information that is semantically related to the 
task at hand assumably draws attention to a higher degree, task-reference as conflict factor 
can be conceived to lead to attentional competition between task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
information. 
Generally, as a theoretical construct, cognitive interference is no observable entity. In the 
study of interference, two behavioral performance measures are generally conceived as 
hallmark or indicator for the occurrence of cognitive interference: 
(a) prolonged reaction times (RTs), construed to reflect the time costs associated with 
the implementation of additional control processes as remediate action, and 
(b) enhanced error rates (ERs), construed to reflect incomplete or deficient control 
processes that failed to resolve interference. 
The following subsections present experimental task paradigms that allow for an 
operationalization (i.e. experimental implementation) of the presented theoretical constructs, 
and therefore to investigate the behavioral and neurobiological correlates of interference so as 
to characterize and understand cognitive control . 
 
1.2.2 Experimental-psychological paradigms of cognitive control and 
interference: the tasks, their basic findings and theoretical concepts 
 
1.2.2.1 Task-switching paradigm: interference due conflicting task-sets 
Task-switching paradigms are applied to experimentally model the frequent shifts between 
different (cognitive) tasks as they are required in every day life. Accordingly, task-switching 
paradigms are well suited to investigate (the behavioral and neurobiological correlates of) 
cognitive processes that underlie the configuration and reconfiguration of task-sets. In a task-
switching experiment, subjects perform two (or more) alternating tasks. Each of the 
implemented tasks requires subjects to focus attention on one certain aspect or attribute (i.e. 
dimension) of the presented target stimuli (e.g. color, size, or shape of geometric objects), 
while values of the dimensions are mapped with different responses, mostly button presses. 
Basically, with respect to the response that has to be given on a trial at hand, the currently 
irrelevant dimension can be congruent (i.e. mapped to the same response), incongruent (i.e. 
mapped to the opposite response) or neutral (i.e. non-mapped) which yields three basic 
experimental conditions: congruent, incongruent and neutral trials. Importantly, the two (or 
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more) tasks of a task-switching paradigm impose antagonistic requirements on participants’ 
attention as the attribute or aspect that has to be focused in the one task has to be inhibited in 
the other task, and vice versa. Consequently, attentional sets (i.e. task-sets) get into conflict or 
competition and have to be shielded against each other which forces subjects to retain a 
consecutive high level of cognitive control. For instance, Monsell and collaborators (Monsell 
et al., 2003) presented subjects with single digits while they had to classify the targets by a 
left or right button press as odd or even in the one task (odd-even task), and as greater or 
smaller than five in the other (high-low task). Gruber and collaborators (e.g. Gruber & 
Goschke, 2004; Gruber et al., 2006) adopted a task-switching paradigm in which subjects are 
presented with colored tube figures while they have to focus on either color or shape of the 
target stimuli in order to select the correct response (left or right button press). There are 
several methods to indicate a subject which task has to be performed on the current or 
upcoming stimulus (see e.g. Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Monsell, 2003). In the alternating-
runs paradigm, tasks alternate every N trials, where N is constant and predictable so that the 
trial sequence tells the subjects when to switch to the other task. In cued task-switching 
paradigms, tasks (i.e. task switches) are unpredictable, and a task cue that appears either 
immediately before or simultaneously with the target indicates the relevant stimulus 
dimension. This paradigm allows for manipulating the cue-target interval (CTI) – also 
referred to as stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) – and thus to investigate preparation effects 
in task switching (e.g. Gruber et al., 2006). 
The major behavioral finding in task-switching paradigms are switch costs, also called task 
repetition benefit (e.g. Wylie & Allport, 2000; Schneider & Logan, 2005). Generally, 
responses after a task switch (i.e. responses on so-called “switch trials”) take longer and are 
more error-prone as compared to responses after a task repetition (i.e. responses on so-called 
“repeat trials”). Interestingly enough, switch costs after incongruent trials appeared to be 
prolonged as compared to switch trials after congruent trials (e.g. Goschke, 2003). This 
finding can be explained by the conflict-triggered control hypothesis of Botvinick and 
colleagues which assumes that response conflict leads to enhanced inhibition of the 
distracting stimulus dimension and the corresponding task-set, referred to as “conflict-
triggered goal-shielding” (Botvinick et al., 2001). The inhibition of the competing task-set 
might still persist on the subsequent trial, and accordingly following task-switches should be 
additionally challenging in that they require to overcome the persisting inhibition (see also 
Goschke, 2003). 
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Generally, task repetitions are considered to benefit from the fact that the relevant task-set is 
already in place. Specifically, switch costs in terms of RT prolongation (i.e. the difference in 
RT between task repetitions and task alternations) are commonly construed as direct measure 
of the duration of the executive control process to implement the appropriate (and to disable 
the “other”) task-set (Monsell, 1996; Monsell, 2003). In a comprehensive series of studies, 
Allport and colleagues (e.g. Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 
2000) provided strong evidence for switch costs being essentially influenced by proactive 
interference or priming effects, and thereby contradicted, at least in part, the common 
interpretation of switch costs as representing task-set reconfiguration (see also Schneider & 
Logan, 2005). Main findings suggestive of a significant contribution of priming effects to 
switch costs comprise enhanced and instable RTs on repetition trials (which gradually decay 
back to baseline in sequences of consecutive repetition trials), (increased) “reverse Stroop 
interference” (i.e. interference from incongruent color on word reading) after task switches, 
“residual switch costs” (i.e. switch costs that still occur after a extensively long preparation 
interval), asymmetrical switch costs in the Stroop paradigm (in terms of higher switch costs 
for the word task, which is the “easier” task, compared to the color task; see 1.2.2.2), and 
enhanced switch costs when the preceding task uses incongruent stimuli or the same stimuli 
as the task to which participants have to switch. The listed findings have in common that they 
strongly suggest that proactive interference (i.e. persisting activation) in terms of priming of 
the inadequate task-set (also called ‘task-set inertia’) or inadequate responses (due to 
established short-term stimulus-response bindings) essentially contributes to the emergence of 
switch costs. 
 
1.2.2.2 The Stroop paradigm: interference due to incongruent lexical word information 
The color-word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935/1992; MacLeod, 1991a) is a landmark experimental 
paradigm in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience and arguably the most widely 
used and cited demonstration of interference in cognitive processing (MacLeod, 1991b; 
Roelofs, 2003). Basically, during Stroop task performance, subjects are presented with color-
word stimuli that are printed in varying ink color, while their task is to name (or respond to) 
the color and thereby to ignore the word’s lexical identity. In Stroop’s original task version 
(Stroop, 1992/1935), subjects dealt with two different cards, an experimental and a control 
cart (representing an experimental and a control condition), each containing 100 target items. 
The experimental cart depicted color words in an incongruent color (e.g. the word BLUE in 
red ink color) while the control cart contained rectangles printed in the same varying ink 
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colors as the word stimuli. The task instruction was for both conditions the same: to respond 
as quickly as possible naming the ink color of every item thereby leaving no error 
uncorrected. The critical measure was the time it took subjects to go through the items of one 
card. The difference between the condition means – with longer processing times for 
incongruent words compared to rectangles – was reckoned to be a measure of interference, 
referred to as Stroop effect or Stroop interference. The found incremental effect was 
uncommonly substantial ranging about 70% and has appeared to be highly replicable in terms 
of both pattern and, interestingly enough, absolute times (MacLeod, 1991a). Basically, 
Stroop-interference can be adequately described as in the following working definition. 
 
Working definition: Stroop-interference comprises interference from task-irrelevant and 
incongruent semantico-lexical information on the processing of some other task-relevant 
information – mostly color – so that agents have to override the predominant response 
tendency to read and respond to word meaning in order to maintain adequate performance. 
 
From Stroop’s initial work to our days, the primary task version has been extended and 
modified in several respects. First, the presentation modus is now mostly computerized which 
allows for a measured consecutive presentation of single items. The major advantage hereby 
is that reaction times can be taken item-wise, timed from the onset of the stimulus to the 
subject’s response, and that false responses can be easily excluded. In the card version, in 
contrast, processing time is taken across all items of one condition (i.e. one card) and 
therefore represents an ambiguous “all in” measure as correct and false responses thereby get 
intermingled. Furthermore, single-item stimulation avoids distraction from previous or 
following stimuli that are simultaneously visible in the card version. 
Second, in modern task adaptations the response modality is mostly manual rather than 
verbal, using key presses instead of overt verbal responses. Concretely, in manual tasks 
different response fingers are defined and each assigned to a certain color, requiring, for 
instance, a right-hand middle finger key press in response to red stimuli and a right-hand 
index finger key press in response to blue stimuli. Manual response modality is especially 
favored in functional neuroimaging studies, because verbal response may yield unfavorable 
movement artifacts in the imaging data. Moreover, the colored rectangle control stimuli of 
Stroop’s initial task version generally has been replaced by control stimuli made up of 
keyboard characters, for example rows of colored Xs. Also, in more recent works, scientists 
did not content themselves with only two experimental conditions as Stroop did, but rather 
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created further trial types. Klein (1964) was among the first who compared multiple 
conditions and thereby unleashed the potential of the paradigm. He compared naming the 
colors of rows of asterisks, meaningless non-words, color-related words (e.g. grass or sky), 
incongruent color words not among the ink colors to be named (incongruent response-
ineligible trials) and incompatible color words in the response set (incongruent response-
eligible trials). Dalrymple-Alford & Budayr (1966) introduced congruent trials in which ink 
color and word meaning correspond to each other. It has been argued that Stroop avoided this 
condition taking into account that subjects may switch to word reading when presented with a 
series of congruent stimuli which would make this condition incomparable to the others 
(MacLeod, 2005). The Stroop task has also been adopted as task-switching paradigm in which 
subjects alternate between color naming and word reading in response to the targets (e.g. 
MacDonald et al., 2000). 
Behavioral findings on the Stroop paradigm and corresponding explanation accounts (for 
neuroimaging findings see subsection 1.3). Basically, the Stroop interference effect denotes 
the phenomenon that color naming is much slower for incongruent trials as compared to 
control trials (see above). This effect still persists even after thousands of trials (MacLeod, 
1998). Stroop interference is generally thought to be a hallmark of competition or conflict 
between cognitive processes in which the (highly facilitated) default tendency to read and 
react to a presented word must be overridden in order to respond to ink color. Most important, 
interference within the paradigm appears to be asymmetrical with interference from an 
incongruent color in the word task being negligible or even absent, that means that there is no 
(or only a small) “reverse Stroop effect”. A widespread account, the relative-speed-of-
processing explanation, attributes this finding to the fact that word information is proceeded 
at higher velocity than color information. This account, however, is challenged by several 
empirical findings. For instance, Glaser and Glaser (1982) compensated for the time 
advantage of word reading by introducing stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) in their 
experimental design. They observed that even if an incongruent color patch is presented 
sufficiently before a to be read color word, still no reverse Stroop effect occurs. Dunbar and 
MacLeod (1984) took an inverse approach and delayed word reading by presenting subjects 
with word stimuli in upside down position or in backward order. Stroop interference, 
however, was unmodified by these manipulations. Taken together, the reported findings 
suggest that processing velocity is not the crucial factor in the emergence of interference 
asymmetry during Stroop task performance. 
 
Introduction  11 
Another account, the differential practice explanation, attributes interference asymmetry 
during Stroop-performance to the extensive training of reading skills during socialization. 
However, several studies showed that extensive training on color naming does not yield a 
reverse Stroop effect. Furthermore, young children and older adults exhibit the largest 
interference scores (e.g. Schiller, 1966), suggesting that control ability rather than reading 
automation plays a major role. Besides interference, several studies also observed facilitation 
due to congruent words within the color task, while facilitation in general does not reach the 
extent of interference (e.g. MacLeod, 1998; Glaser & Glaser, 1982). Of note, color-related 
words (e.g. sky or grass) also yield interference, but not as much as real color words (e.g. blue 
or green), commonly referred to as semantic gradient (Dalrymple-Alford, 1972). Studies 
which used the manual task version showed a response or task set effect in that response-
eligible color words (i.e. words that denote response-mapped colors) yielded stronger 
interference (a stronger effect on RT) compared to response-ineligible color words (e.g. 
Proctor, 1978; van Veen & Carter, 2005).  
 
1.2.2.3 Oddball tasks: interference due to low-frequency events 
During oddball tasks, cognitive interference emanates from unexpected low-frequency events, 
so called oddballs. Specifically, oddballs – as investigated in the current work – consist of 
infrequent task-irrelevant deviations that occur outside the current focus of attention, that 
therefore may be referred to as ‘task-irrelevant oddballs’. 
 
Note: The use of the term ‘oddball’ in the context of cognitive interference might be somehow 
ambiguous, as originally low-frequency events have been investigated as targets rather than 
distractors in vigilance or so-called target detection tasks. Low-frequency events in target 
detection tasks might be adequately termed ‘task-relevant oddballs’ as opposed to ‘task-
irrelevant oddballs’ to which the present work refers. For an unambiguous, clear distinction 
between task-relevant and task-irrelevant oddballs, target detection experiments and their 
findings will be presented below in this subsection. 
 
If salient enough, unexpected low-frequency events capture attention and lead to an orienting 
response that results in an unintended attentional switch. It has been repeatedly shown that 
when task-irrelevant information occurs infrequently it attracts attentional resources to a 
greater extent and thereby impairs the processing of task-relevant stimulus information (e.g. 
Schröger & Wolf, 1998; Berti & Schröger, 2001). Important to note, oddball events yield 
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interference (in terms of performance deterioration) without necessarily being incongruent or 
incompatible with task-relevant information at either the semantic or motor level. Thus, 
oddball interference can be expected to occur at a pure attentional level and hence may be 
conceived a particular kind of attentional competition (see 1.2.1). It has been repeatedly 
suggested that low-frequency events lead to an involuntary orienting-response which serves to 
direct attention to potentially important changes in the environment (e.g. Goschke, 2003; 
Gruber & Goschke 2004). This process may be thought of as part of a highly adaptive 
function of background monitoring that takes into account possible threats or opportunities 
occurring outside the current focus of attention (see 1.1.2). On the other hand, however, 
orienting responses to novel stimuli may interrupt a currently required attentional set, and 
consequently the agent may have to override the automatic attentional switch in order to 
maintain goal-directed action. 
Orienting responses and the mismatch negativity. Involuntary attention shifts have been 
originally described and explained by the orienting-reflex (OR) theory (Sokolov, 1963). This 
theory assumes that repetitive sensory features of the environment get represented in a 
neuronal model while sensory deviations from this model yield the OR. Thus, the theory 
postulates a neural stimulus-change detection mechanisms. Näätänen with collaborators (e.g. 
Näätänen, et al., 1978; Näätänen, 1990/1992) investigated stimulus-change detection for the 
auditory domain. He found a frontocentral negative event-related potential (ERP) component 
N2 that is reliably elicited by any discernible change in the physical features of a repetitive 
sound. In accordance with the OR theory, Näätänen interpreted this so-called mismatch 
negativity (MMN) as the neuronal substrate of an automatic cortical change-detection process 
in which a difference is found between the current input and a memory trace representation of 
a regularity. Moreover, Näätänen (1990) postulated that the MMN is involved in triggering a 
signal for attention switching after the perceptual detection. In line with Näätänen’s 
assumption, there is converging evidence that the neuronal process eliciting the MMN is 
associated with involuntary attentional switching (Escera et al., 1998). For instance, Schröger 
(1996) found substantial performance deterioration after MMN-eliciting task-irrelevant tones, 
while this effect was strengthened for decreasing frequency of occurrence of the deviant 
auditory stimuli. 
While the MMN is well defined in the auditory domain, the question arose whether it also 
exists in the visual modality. Pazo-Alvarez and colleagues (Pazo-Alvarez et al., 2003) 
reviewed relevant studies and provided convincing evidence for a visual MMN homologue. 
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Task-relevant oddballs. Important to note, the term “oddball” has been initially developed in 
the study of attentional vigilance, in so-called target-detection paradigms (e.g. Sutton et al., 
1965). Here, subjects detect and respond to infrequent target events that are embedded in a 
series of repetitive distractor events. On the one hand, task-relevant oddballs are not covered 
by the working definition of cognitive interference given above that basically presumes that 
interference necessarily emanates from task-irrelevant, unattended events or information (see 
1.2.1). Therefore, task-relevant oddballs are actually not part of the current work’s subject 
matter. On the other hand, however, processing of task-relevant oddballs (targets) and task-
irrelevant oddballs (distractors) may plausibly engage common neural mechanisms, as both 
include the detection of rare events (Bledowski et al., 2004). The detection of infrequent 
targets consistently appeared to evoke a prominent ERP component – following the target 
onset after 300-600ms and with its maximum over the parietal scalp – refereed to as P300 or 
P3b (Smith et al., 1970). The P3b is preceded by another small positive component that peaks 
over the frontal lobe and that has been called the P3a or “novelty P3” (Courchesne et al., 
1975; Knight, 1996). P3a has also been found in studies using task-irrelevant oddballs and has 
been interpreted to reflect an initial automatic orienting response to rare and salient events, 
independent of their behavioral relevance. Hence, the P3a plausibly reflects the neural 
substrate of the ‘processional overlap’ of task-relevant and task-irrelevant oddballs, 
assumably consisting of an attentional orienting response. 
Nevertheless, the main interest of the current work are task-irrelevant oddballs that 
substantially impair task-relevant stimulus processing as indexed by RT prolongation. Studies 
showed that interference by task-irrelevant oddballs evokes the MMN and the P3a as well as a 
subsequent negative component in the 400-600ms range, called re-orienting negativity (RON; 
see Schröger & Wolf, 1998). In this context, MMN, P3a and RON may be assumed to reflect 
a processional succession comprising change detection, attentional switching and subsequent 
re-orienting to task-relevant information. Thus, in conjunction, the presented ERP 
components yield an theoretical conceptualization of oddball interference that can be 
summarized as in the following working definition. 
 
Working definition: Oddball interference denotes an involuntary orienting response 
(attentional switch) to rare and task-irrelevant events that requires subjects to perform a 
subsequent re-orienting of attentional resources (to task-relevant information) in order to 
meet current task requirements and to maintain adequate performance. 
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Milham and colleagues (Milham et al., 2003a) were among the first who investigated oddball 
interference and incongruity effects (i.e. cognitive conflict) in the same experimental 
paradigm, while they focused in particular on prefrontal cortex’s (PFC’s) involvement. 
Specifically, they employed an oddball variant of the Stroop paradigm (see 1.2.3.2) that 
justified a direct comparison of the influence of low-frequently occurring task-irrelevant word 
information (i.e. oddball interference) on the one hand, and the influence of response-
incongruent task-irrelevant word information (i.e. Stroop-interference) on the other. They 
report both, an activation overlap as well as an activation dissociation in prefrontal cortices 
which led them to propose a regional subdivision along the anterior-posterior axes of PFC’s 
attentional control function. According to Milham and colleagues (see also Brass & von 
Cramon, 2004), the posterior inferior PFC in the vicinity of premotor cortex – which was 
activated for both oddball and incongruity trials – is primarily involved in manipulating 
posterior regions to ensure selection of task-relevant information, whereas more anteriorly 
located regions within inferior PFC – which were exclusively activated for incongruent trials 
– are primarily responsible for biasing maintenance and selection of task-relevant information 
in working-memory. [As this study is of special relevance for the current work, it will be 
presented in more detail in a following subsection (see 1.3.5).] 
 
1.2.2.4 Other interference paradigms 
The Flanker-task is another quite common cognitive task that involves responding to a 
centered stimulus that is surrounded by peripheral distracting stimuli, so-called flankers. The 
original task was introduced by Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) and involved the presentation of a 
string of five letters while the middle letter served as target and the four lateral letters as 
irrelevant, distracting flankers. In a suchlike task, subjects might be instructed, for instance, to 
press a left key if the central letter is a T and a right key if the central letter is an M. Basically, 
the paradigm allows to operationalize two experimental conditions: during 
compatible/congruent trials, the four flankers map to the same response as the target (e.g. 
MMMMM), while during incompatible/incongruent trials the flankers map to a different 
response (e.g. TTMTT). In another prevalently used version of the paradigm, the centered 
target stimulus consists of an arrow which is flanked by distracting arrows that point in either 
the same (i.e. congruent) or other (i.e. incongruent) direction (e.g. Botvinick et al., 2001; Fan 
et al., 2002). 
In the spatial conflict or Simon task, target stimuli are presented in different locations of the 
visual field. Thereby, the location of the target could be compatible or incompatible with the 
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response to be given (i.e. on the same or opposite side as the mapped key press), and also 
could be neutral (i.e. presented in a center position). The Simon effect involves conflict 
between target location and the direction of the matching response as it becomes obvious in 
prolonged RTs on incompatible trials of spatial tasks (Simon & Berbaum, 1990; Gerardi-
Caulton, 2000).  
 
1.3 Neuroimaging studies on attentional control and cognitive interference: 
major findings and related theoretical assumptions 
The investigation of the neural correlates of cognitive control and attentional selection has 
become a major research focus in cognitive neuroscience. Numerous fMRI studies using 
various paradigms have been carried out to delineate the brain regions that govern the 
detection and resolution of cognitive conflict and interference. In the following subsections, 
neuroimaging studies’ results and related theoretical assumptions that are relevant for the 
current work’s purposes will be presented. 
 
1.3.1 Conflict resolution and neural mechanisms to impose an attentional set for 
task-relevant information 
It is a quite common assumption that neural structures involved in attentional selection form 
two distinct systems, one anterior and one posterior (Posner & DeHaene, 1994). Thereby, the 
anterior system is considered to be responsible for executive processes (i.e. the exertion of 
cognitive control) while the posterior system is primarily involved in the selection of target 
information according to the anterior system’s top-down influence. In the same sense, 
LaBerge (2005) distinguished the control of attention in frontal areas from the expression of 
attention in posterior cortical areas, especially parietal cortices. Accordingly, many studies 
have suggested that attentional selection basically depends on neural activity in a fronto-
parietal network wherein frontal operations of executive control are directed at parietal areas 
where activity can influence the early processing of incoming sensory stimulation (e.g. 
Hopfinger et al., 2000; Corbetta et al., 2002; for reviews see Corbetta & Shulmann, 2002; 
LaBerge, 2005). 
It has been repeatedly proposed that attentional selection in general and resolving cognitive 
conflict or interference in particular works through manipulating, i.e. boosting, activity in 
those brain areas which are specialized for processing the sensory information which has to be 
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attended (e.g. Cohen et al., 1990; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Cohen et al., 1996; Wojciulik et 
al., 1998; Banich et al., 2001; Weissman et al., 2005; Egner & Hirsch, 2005). In this context, 
it is generally assumed that prefrontal regions “alert” those posterior processing areas that are 
involved in processing the task-relevant feature. In a classic study using positron emission 
tomography (PET), Corbetta collaborators (Corbetta et al., 1991) provide strong support for 
the existence of a suchlike neuro-attentional mechanism. They consecutively presented 
subjects with abstract objects that could be distinguished by three visual attributes (i.e. 
stimulus dimensions): shape, color, and size. Subjects performed three different object 
matching tasks while in each task they had to refer to one specified dimension and to ignore 
the two remaining ones. As central finding, neural activity was modulated in different 
posterior processing regions depending on the visual attribute that has to be attended. For 
instance, when subjects had to make the matching decision based on color, enhanced brain 
activation was observed in lingual fusiform regions that previously have been implicated in 
color perception (e.g. Zeki & Marini, 1998). 
While amplification of neuronal responses seems to play an important role in attentional 
selection, there is likewise evidence for inhibitory suppressive mechanisms that substantially 
contribute to attention regulation (Kastner et al., 1998; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). Thus, 
both target amplification and distractor inhibition appear to be feasible neural mechanisms of 
attentional functioning, and the question arose whether neural mechanisms of processing 
cognitive interference (i.e. conflict resolution) comprise both or solely one of them. Recently, 
Egner and Hirsch (2005) reported findings of an fMRI study that substantiate the notion of 
target amplification as primary mechanism in conflict resolution. Specifically, they employed 
a modified Stroop task using face stimuli as targets and thereby manipulated trial-by-trial 
levels of conflict and cognitive control. The analyses of the fMRI data showed enhanced 
activity in the fusiform face area (FFA) – an extrastriate visual region specialized for face 
processing (Kanwisher et al., 1997) – under high control conditions when faces served as 
task-relevant information, but not when they served as task-irrelevant distractors. 
Furthermore, Egner and Hirsch conducted connectivity analyses using the 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) approach (Friston et al., 1997; see 4.5.3). The results 
showed enhanced coupling between FFA and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) – a 
candidate region for the implementation of cognitive control thought to provide neural signals 
biasing extrastriate visual processing (MacDonald et al., 2000; Kerns et al., 2004; see 1.3.3) – 
under high control conditions, again only when faces served as targets, but not when they 
served as distractors. Taken together, the findings strongly suggest that attentional 
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amplification of target features serves as primary mechanism in conflict resolution, and 
findings provide no evidence for a mechanism that suppresses interference-inducing 
distractors. 
 
1.3.2 Segregated but interacting frontoparietal attentional systems for 
top-down and bottom-up processing 
In previous subsections two principle and antagonistic levels of cognitive processing are 
described which are thought to provide complementary attentional functions: top-down (i.e. 
conceptually-driven) processing and bottom-up (i.e. sensory-driven) processing (see 1.1.2 and 
1.1.3). Corbetta & Shulman (2002) reviewed a vast body of neuroimaging studies and thereby 
came up with a neuroanatomical model that relate these cognitive functions with two 
segregated but interacting neural systems, represented by a dorsal and a ventral frontoparietal 
network. 
(a) Dorsal frontoparietal network for top-down control 
The first system is represented by a largely bilateral dorsal frontoparietal network that 
includes parts of the intraparietal cortex and superior frontal cortex, specifically the frontal 
eye fields (FEF). Corporate activation in intraparietal and superior frontal cortices in relation 
to voluntary attentional orienting have been reported for both spatial attention – i.e. attention 
to different locations in the visual field (e.g. Gitelman et al., 1999; Kastner et al., 1999) – and 
feature attention – i.e. attention to different object features like color, shape or motion (e.g. 
Shulman et al., 1999; Shulman et al., 2001) – and beyond that have been related to motor 
preparation and motor attention (e.g. Snyder et al., 1997; Kawashima et al., 1995; Rowe et al., 
2000). Based on the reviewed findings, Corbetta and Shulman conjecture that top-down (i.e. 
goal-directed) selection of both stimuli and motor actions is implemented by a dorsal 
frontopariertal attention network. In particular, this neural system could be construed to 
implement whole task-sets by relating relevant sensory representations to relevant motor 
representations. 
(b) Ventral frontoparietal network for bottom-up processing 
As functional counterpart to the dorsal frontoparietal network, Corbetta and Shulman propose 
a ventral frontoparietal network, strongly lateralized to the right hemisphere, that mainly 
comprises the temporoparietal cortex referred to as ‘temporoparietal junction’ (TPJ) and the 
inferior frontolateral cortex. This system is thought to provide an alerting mechanism that 
detects and orients attention to sensory changes in the environment that are of potential 
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behavioral relevance. Therefore, the system works as a ’circuit breaker’ for the dorsal system, 
directing attention to salient events. Accordingly, studies showed activation in the TPJ and 
inferior PFC in response to unexpected sensory changes across different modalities, while 
activation was additionally strengthened when sensory changes were task-relevant (e.g. 
Downar et al., 2000; Downar et al., 2001).  
Taken together, Corbetta and Shulman (see Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) carried out a 
neuroanatomical model of attentional control that relate the complementary mechanisms of 
top-down and bottom-up processing to circumscribed cortical structures that are organized in 
segregated but interacting neural networks. In their complementary function, these neural 
systems may afford to meet the antagonistic requirements on attention as they are imposed 
during goal-directed action in a changing environment (see sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3). 
 
1.3.3 The anterior cingulate cortex’s function in cognitive control: selection-for-
action versus conflict detection 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), situated on the medial surface of the frontal lobes, is 
commonly believed to be critically involved in cognitive control and the regulation of 
attention (Posner & Peterson, 1990; D’Esposito et al., 1995; Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998). 
Numerous neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies revealed ACC activation during the 
performance of a variety of cognitive tasks that require selection between stimulus attributes 
and/or response alternatives. In particular, the ACC appears consistently activated in studies 
using the Stroop task when incongruent trials are contrasted against neutral or congruent trials 
(e.g. Pardo et al., 1990; Carter et al., 1995; MacDonald et al., 2000; Fan et al., 2003; Mitchell, 
2005). Based on this vast body of evidence, it is widely accepted that the ACC plays a 
prominent role in cognitive control, however, beyond this consensus, it still remains a matter 
of discussion how the ACC exactly contributes to conflict processing. Basically, one can 
distinguish two competing theoretical accounts of ACC’s function in conflict processing, the 
‘selection-for-action’ account and the ‘conflict monitoring‘ account. 
(1) The selection-for-action account 
The ‘selection-for-action‘ account (Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998; Petersen et al., 1999) 
postulates that the ACC directly exerts top-down attentional control by selecting information 
or objects in the environment as triggers for action. Thus, according to this account, the ACC 
is thought to represent an executive neural instance which imposes or implements a required 
attentional set. In particular, the account presumes that ACC helps to resolve cognitive 
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conflict or interference by increasing processing resources towards task-relevant information 
so as to limit interference from task-irrelevant information. In a recent fMRI study, Weissman 
and collaborators (Weissman et al., 2005) sought to examine the role of the dorsal/caudal 
ACC in conflict processing, and thereby they wanted to test whether this neural structure 
actually contributes to conflict resolution in a direct manner by boosting attentional resources 
towards relevant events. For this purpose, they adopted a cued task-switching paradigm 
wherein participants had to attend either the local or the global aspect of hierarchical letter 
stimuli (e.g. a big letter S composed of smaller letters H), referred to as ‘global/local task‘. 
The authors report that greater ACC activity during distraction was associated with reduced 
behavioral measures of interference. Furthermore, greater ACC activity was associated with 
cues to attend local features compared to cues to attend local features, while attentional 
demands are enhanced when subjects have to attend local features (Weissman et al., 2003). 
Weissman and colleagues interpreted their results in line with the selection-for-action account 
as indicating that ACC is basically involved in focusing attention on behaviorally relevant 
stimuli, especially when behavioral goals are threatened by interfering distractors. 
(2) The conflict monitoring account 
Against the selection-for-action account, other authors have put forward the ‘action-
monitoring theory‘ or ‘conflict-monitoring account‘ (Botvinick et al., 1998; Carter et al., 
1998). This theory is based on the general assumption that cognitive control has not only a 
regulative dimension by which top-down influence is exerted, but also to comprise an 
evaluative function that monitors information processing for current control demands and that 
thus allows for appropriate, context-sensitive control adjustments (Botvinick et al., 2001). The 
theoretical assumption of a complementary evaluative mechanisms in cognitive control 
appears to be necessary because without it, control conceptions remain “humuncular” 
assuming a independent, self-guided instance to implement control (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
van Veen & Carter, 2002). Importantly, the regulative function and the evaluative function are 
thought to be represented by distinct but interacting neural structures. Specifically in the 
conflict monitoring account, neural activity in the ACC is construed as neural substrate of the 
evaluative function. Hence, according to this account, the ACC does not exert top-down 
control but instead detects and signals the occurrence of conflict in information processing. 
Importantly, the ACC response to conflict is thought to trigger subsequent shifts in cognitive 
control (i.e. to trigger enhanced control efforts), which serve to reduce conflict in subsequent 
performance. Thereby, the adaptation of control efforts as proper executive control activity is 
attributed to other neural systems, primarily located in the frontolateral cortex, that refer to 
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ACC’s signal. MacDonald and colleagues (MacDonald et al., 2000) provided key evidence 
for the conflict monitoring account. Using a task-switching version of the Stroop task, 
MacDonalds and colleagues observed a double dissociation of activity in ACC and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). While ACC was selectively engaged by conflict 
emanating from incongruent stimuli, DLPFC was selectively engaged in task-preparation, 
especially in response to color cues indicating the more demanding color task. Importantly, 
there was no enhanced instruction-related activity in ACC for color cues and no enhanced 
response-related activity in DLPFC for incongruent stimuli. Based on their findings, the 
authors argue that DLPFC translates ACC’s signal into the implementation of executive 
control. 
The study, however, was strongly criticized for the extremely long (12.5 sec) cue-target 
interval – included to clearly separate preparation-related from response-related processes – 
that precludes a straightforward interpretation of the reported results. Weissman and 
colleagues (see Weissman et al., 2004; Weissman et al., 2005) convincingly argued that the 
long cue-target interval putatively reduced the likelihood that participants oriented their 
attention at the time of cue presentation and, in turn, the probability of observing activity in 
ACC which was related to focusing attention during the cue presentation. Hence, from this 
perspective, the conflict-related ACC activity in the MacDonald study may still reflect 
processes that focus attention on task-relevant stimuli. Generally, long trial durations arguably 
lower the overall task difficulty and the level of conflict which, in turn, reduces the degree to 
which control execution is necessary to achieve an adequate level of performance. Hence, the 
long cue-target interval (i.e. long trial duration) in the MacDonald study might have 
significantly diminished the probability of observing greater (control-related) ACC activity 
for color cues (that indicate the putatively more difficult task) as compared to word cues. 
The conflict monitoring hypothesis builds up on an earlier ’performance monitoring’ account 
that assumes that ACC activation represents the neural substrate of an error detection system 
or mechanism. It is a well-established finding that ACC transiently activates in association 
with the commission of errors. Error-related ACC activation has been investigated initially in 
ERP studies where it takes the form of a transient negative potential referred to as ‘error-
related negativity’ (ERN) (e.g. Falkenstein et al., 2000). Later, fMRI studies corroborate 
neurophysiological findings and likewise reported error-related ACC engagement (e.g. Kiehl 
et al., 2000; Menon et al., 2001). Studies led to the postulation of a neural error-detection 
system that gets activated when a comparison between representations of the appropriate (i.e. 
correct, intended) and the actual response yields a mismatch. This system has been localized 
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in the frontomedian wall leading to the error detection hypothesis of the ACC. The error 
detection model was challenged by an fMRI study which demonstrated ACC activation 
during error trials as well as during correct trials involving high response competition (Carter 
et al., 1998), while this study marks the origin of the conflict monitoring account. 
As an integrative account, Brown & Braver (2005) put forward the ‘error-likelihood 
hypothesis’ which accounts conflict and error detection as special cases of a more general 
performance monitoring mechanism. In this model, the ACC does not detect errors or conflict 
per se but more generally provides a prediction signal of error probability as an anticipation of 
a reduction in reward. In a quite similar sense, it has been proposed that the ACC monitors for 
the earliest indication for increased attentional demands in order to prompt additional control 
efforts to prevent negative future outcomes (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
 
1.3.4 Common neural activations across different situations of cognitive 
interference 
Prior to the current investigation, Oliver Gruber and collaborators conducted a study running 
under the working title “Perseus” (see Gruber & Goschke, 2004; Melcher et al., 2004) that has 
been created within the scope of the same research program as the current investigation 
(priority program “executive functions” of the German Research Foundation (DFG); project 
title: “Dynamic interactions between complementary components of executive control”). 
Important to note, the findings of this fMRI study substantially inspired and influenced the 
development of the current investigation that in part builds up on the results and associated 
interpretations that will be reported in this subsection. 
Essentially, the study was set out to investigate the neural mechanisms that enable humans to 
meet the antagonistic requirements on attentional control as imposed during goal-directed 
action in a changing environment (see 1.1.3). For this purpose, Gruber and collaborators 
adopted a cued task-switching paradigm using colored geometrical objects (tube figures) as 
target stimuli. Thereby, subjects were to classify targets according to either color or shape 
(providing a color task and a shape task) by either a left or right manual response consisting of 
button presses with the right index and middle finger, respectively. The experimental design 
included three basic conditions – congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials – that equally 
appeared in the color and the shape task. On congruent trials, color and shape were mapped to 
the same manual response while on incongruent trials color and shape indicated opposed 
responses. On neutral trials, the currently irrelevant dimension was not mapped to either 
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response. The behavioral data showed reliable switch costs (i.e. significantly longer RTs on 
switch-trials compared to repeat-trials) and a substantial effect of incongruency (i.e. 
significantly prolonged RTs on incongruent trials compared to neutral trials). Both behavioral 
effects are quite common findings in the investigation of task switching performance (see 
1.2.2.1) and therefore were perfectly in line with the study’s prior expectations. Beyond this, 
however, congruent trials exhibited significantly longer RTs compared to neutral trials in the 
shape-task, whereas congruent trials have been expected to produce facilitation rather than 
interference. Retrospectively, the prolonged RTs have been conclusively interpreted to 
represent a mismatch-like or oddball effect, as congruent trials occurred rarely in the 
experimental stimulation (i.e. represented low-frequency events) as compared to the prevalent 
neutral trials. This difference in frequency of trial types resulted from a special design feature 
that had been implemented for fMRI-methodological reasons. Specifically, trials that entered 
into the statistical analyses – referred to as ‘critical trials’ – should be preceded by a baseline 
period in order to minimize the protracted effects of preceding trials on the fMRI signal, 
taking into account the inertia of the BOLD response. The baseline period over which the 
fMRI signal should recover was created by a sequence of three consecutive neutral trials that 
did not enter in the statistical analyses. As a side effect, this arrangement of trials caused a 
disproportionateness between congruent and incongruent trials on the one hand and neutral 
trials on the other, while the latter represented the vast majority (five-sixths of the trials were 
neutral and only one sixth congruent or incongruent). With regard to the shape-task, the 
described disproportionateness took form in a superior number of white colored stimuli, as 
white represented the neutral color value. Due to this, response-mapped red or blue colors on 
congruent or incongruent trials in the shape-task represented low-frequency events in the 
currently task-irrelevant dimension and therefore may be conceived as ‘task-irrelevant 
oddballs’ (see 1.2.2.3). Accordingly, with regard to the behavioral findings, Gruber and 
collaborators argued that the rare occurrence of a rarely congruent color within the shape-task 
involuntarily captured participants’ attention and led to an orienting response (i.e. attentional 
switch) towards the currently irrelevant color dimension. Consequently, the currently 
appropriate attentional set (or task set) was disrupted and had to be reestablished in order to 
meet the task requirements. 
The analysis of the neuroimaging data revealed likewise a rather interesting finding: both the 
described mismatch-like effect due to rarely occurring congruent colors (represented by the 
contrast ‘congruent vs. neutral’) and response-conflict due to incongruent colors (represented 
by the contrast ‘incongruent vs. neutral’) enhanced brain activity in virtually the same cortical 
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network. The corresponding left-hemispherically accentuated activation pattern comprised the 
lateral PFC, especially loci along the inferior frontal sulcus (IFS) and precentral sulcus, the 
pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), cortices along the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), as well 
as occipito-temporal cortices (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Differences between incongruent 
trials and congruent trials were only quantitative in nature, with incongruent trials exhibiting 







Figure 1: Neuroimaging results of the fMRI study “Perseus”. Activations evoked by rarely 








Figure 2: Neuroimaging results of the fMRI study “Perseus”. Activations evoked by rarely 
occurring irrelevant, congruent colors (oddball effect). Contrast: congruent vs. neutral. 
 
In conclusion, in the study’s data, response conflict (i.e. interference at the motor level) and 
interference from task-irrelevant oddballs (i.e. interference at the attentional level / 
competition) appeared to engage the same neural activation pattern or network. A preliminary 
interpretation of the finding was that the neuro-attentional system may possess a background 
monitoring mechanisms for the occurrence of potential behavioral conflict (see Melcher et al., 
2004). Because oddballs may indicate a potential behavioral conflict, the putative monitoring 
mechanisms may recruit the same control mechanisms (i.e. neural activations) in response to 
low-frequency events as can be observed in relation to response-incongruent trials thought to 
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evoke proper response conflict. However, this interpretation is somewhat compromised by the 
fact that the incongruent trials were equally rare as congruent trials. Consequently, 
incongruent trials may also have led to oddball interference in addition to response conflict, 
while this putative ‘procedural overlap’ between incongruent and congruent trials may have 
contributed to some degree to the observed activation overlap. In any case, independent of the 
latter objection, its important to emphasize that response conflict during incongruent trials in 
the presented study did not recruit additional neural activation compared to rarely occurring 
congruent trials, representing ‘color oddballs’. This finding strongly suggests the existence of 
a general or core neural mechanism of interference processing (i.e. resolution) that is recruited 
across different kinds of interference occurring at various levels of cognitive processing. 
Consistent with this conclusion, Zysset and colleagues reported neural activation related to 
Stroop-interference in a cortical network that broadly overlap with the one that was found 
related to interference due to color oddballs in the above presented task-switching study. 
Specifically, Zysset and colleagues (Zysset et al., 2000) adopted a special version of the 
Stroop paradigm, the ‘Matching Stroop Task’, that was introduced by Treisman and Fearnley 
(Treisman & Fearnley, 1969). In this paradigm, on each trial subjects are presented with two 
color word stimuli simultaneously while they have to match the ink color of the first (i.e. 
above-standing) word – who’s lexical meaning could be incongruent, congruent, or neutral 
with respect to the attended color, providing three experimental conditions – to the lexical 
meaning of the second (i.e. below-standing) word. This second word is always printed in 
neutral black. Accordingly, Stroop-interference takes place during the processing of the first 
item and is separated from response-related processes taking place during the subsequent 
matching decision. Therefore, response-related processes can be kept constant across all 
experimental conditions and hence Stroop-interference in this paradigm is investigated at a 
purely semantic level. Specifically, the Stroop interference contrasts (i.e. “incongruent against 
congruent” or “incongruent against neutral”) in this paradigm do not intermingle semantic 
conflict and response/motor conflict as it might be the case in more traditional task versions 
[for a distinction between (i.e. a separation of) response conflict and semantic conflict in the 
Stroop paradigm, see van Veen & Carter, 2005]. Essentially, Zysset and colleagues reported 
neural activation related to Stroop-interference (revealed by the contrast “incongruent vs. 
neutral”) in a (fronto-parietal) cortical network (comprising of the pre-SMA, posterior IFS, 
IPS, and occipitotemporal cortices) that largely corresponded to the one that was found in 
relation to color oddballs in the task-switching study of Gruber and colleagues. Thus, 
considering the two presented studies in conjunction, Stroop-interference and oddball 
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interference – as two distinct operationalizations of interference implemented in two different 
studies – appear to produce essentially the same patterns of neural activation. The observed 
broad activation overlap conclusively suggests that both kinds of interference – Stroop-
interference and oddball-interference – engage the same neurocognitive control mechanism of 
interference resolution. This assertion motivated the current investigation that, in part, 
represents a synthetic combination of the fMRI study “Perseus” and the study of Zysset and 
colleagues, as it examines both Stroop-interference and oddball interference simultaneously. 
In particular, one aim of the current work was to directly compare Stroop-interference and 
oddball-interference, this time operationalized within the same experimental paradigm and 
including the same subjects, so as to ensure high comparability (see 1.4.1). 
 
1.3.5 The inferior frontal junction area: a prominent activation focus in cognitive 
control 
One prominent focus of the described shared activation pattern was situated in the posterior 
inferior frontolateral cortex, in the vicinity of the junction of the inferior frontal sulcus and 
precentral sulcus. Due to its anatomical location within the transition zone of premotor and 
prefrontal cortex, this region has been previously termed the ‘inferior frontal junction area’ 
(IFJA) (Brass & von Cramon, 2004). A recent series of brain imaging studies converge to 
strongly suggest that the IFJA plays a pivotal role in cognitive control (for review, see 
Derrfuss et al., 2005). Thereby, it is important to note that the IFJA, given its posterior 
location within frontolateral cortex, is not part of the mid-dorsolateral PFC (mid-DLPFC) to 
which the previous literature pointed most consistently as the crucial fronto-lateral area in 
cognitive control (e.g. Petrides, 2000; MacDonald et al., 2000). One may assume that the 
special interest in the mid-DLPFC during the last few years may have led to a neglect of the 
IFJA and even sometimes to an inappropriate labeling of the IFJA as DLPFC. In other words, 
the primary role attributed to the mid-DLFPC in cognitive control may be due to the fact that 
consistent activation in the IFJA has been ignored (see Brass et al., 2005). 
The neuroanatomical location of the IFJA has been well defined both in terms of its 
coordinates in the standard stereotactic space (Derrfuss et al., 2004) as well as in terms of its 
cytoarchitectural structure (Amunts et al., 2004). In contrast, the use of the term DLPFC 
appears ambiguous and inhomogeneous and hence can not be referred to a distinct neural 
structure (Gruber, 2005). 
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Neural activity in the IFJA has been reported for a wide range of attentionally demanding 
cognitive tasks and conditions (for review, see Derrfuss et al., 2005). For instance, the inferior 
lateral PFC has been related to task-set preparation (Brass and von Cramon, 2004; Gruber et 
al., 2006), cognitive set shifting (e.g. Konishi et al., 1998; Dove et al., 2000; Pollmann et al., 
2000; Braver et al., 2003; Brass and von Cramon, 2004), and response inhibition (Konishi et 
al., 1999; Konishi et al., 2003). Furthermore, and most interestingly for the current 
investigation, the IFJA has been related in particular to the processing of Stroop interference 
(e.g. Leung et al., 2000; Banich et al., 2000/2001; Zysset et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2003a) 
and task-irrelevant oddballs (e.g. Milham et al., 2003a; Gruber & Goschke, 2004). 
Taken together, studies provide strong evidence that the IFJA plays a crucial role in cognitive 
control involving task-set management, i.e. the activation of task-representations (see 
Derrfuss et al., 2004/2005) and the selection of task-relevant over task-irrelevant information 
(see Milham et al., 2003a), the putative core process in the resolution of cognitive conflict and 
interference (see 1.2.1). Moreover, studies not only help to describe the IFJA’s putative 
cognitive function, but also show that the IFJA can be functionally separated from other 
frontolateral areas, specifically from mid-DLPFC. For instance, Milham and collaborators 
(Milham et al., 2003a) provided evidence for a functional dissociation along the anterior-
posterior axis in attentional functioning of the lateral PFC. In particular, they conducted an 
event-related fMRI study in which they sought to delineate the influence of rare and task-
irrelevant word information – i.e. task-irrelevant word oddballs – on prefrontal cortex’s 
involvement in cognitive control. Furthermore, they wanted to determine whether response-
incongruent word meaning (i.e. Stroop-interference) produces activation in areas similar or 
distinct from those sensitive to word oddballs (i.e. oddball interference). As a main result, 
both word oddball trials and Stroop-incongruent trials enhanced brain activity in the posterior 
frontolateral cortex corresponding to the IFJA. More anterior areas referring to the mid-
DLPFC, on the other hand, were selectively activated by Stroop-incongruent stimuli, and not 
by oddballs. Based on these results, Milham and colleagues concluded that the posterior 
inferior PFC (i.e. the IFJA) is primarily involved in manipulating posterior regions to ensure 
the selection of task-relevant information. The latter assertion is additionally supported by the 
fact that the posterior lateral PFC is anatomically strongly interconnected with posterior 
processing regions (Barbas & Mesulam, 1981; Petrides & Pandya, 1984; Petrides & Pandya, 
1999). In contrast, more anterior regions within inferior lateral PFC are thought to be 
primarily responsible for biasing maintenance and selection of task-relevant information in 
working-memory. Brass and von Cramon (Brass & von Cramon, 2004) proposed a functional 
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dissociation along the anterior-posterior axis within lateral PFC that is quite similar to the one 
of Milham colleagues that has been presented above. Brass and von Cramon conducted an 
fMRI study on task-set preparation and based on their findings conjectured that while more 
anterior prefrontal regions might be mainly involved in maintaining and manipulating 
working memory content, the posterior frontolateral cortex, i.e. the IFJA, would provide 
context-related updating of task representations, i.e. the implementation of relevant task-sets. 
 
1.4 Aims and hypotheses of the current investigation 
Generally, the current work sought to investigate behavioral and neurobiological correlates of 
cognitive performance during conditions of interference and conflict in order to elucidate 
neural mechanisms of cognitive control. Thereby, the main interest was in two situations of 
interference, Stroop-interference and oddball interference, which should be examined as 
operationalized within the same task paradigm. The following subsections present related 
aims and expectations in more detail. 
 
1.4.1 Behavioral effects of interference 
Primarily, it was expected that conditions of cognitive interference produce substantial 
behavioral effects, i.e. that interference trials exhibit prolonged reaction times (RTs) as 
compared to non-interference or baseline trials. Specifically, RTs should serve as validation 
criterion to demonstrate that the implemented experimental manipulation was indeed effective 
in inducing the processes of interest, Stroop-interference and oddball interference. Thereby, 
during trials of Stroop-interference, participants would have to overcome the predominant 
tendency to respond to incongruent word meaning as response-eligible but task-irrelevant 
dimension (see 1.2.3.2). On the other hand, oddball conditions were expected to evoke an 
attentional orienting response which participants would have to override in order maintain 
adequate performance (see 1.2.3.3). Both types of interference were expected to incur time 
costs that become obvious in prolonged RTs of the respective trial types. 
 
1.4.2 Neural effects of interference 
Generally, regarding the neuroimaging data, it was expected that experimental conditions of 
interference evoke activations in neural structures that have been previously related to 
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cognitive conflict and interference (see 1.3). Moreover, it was explicitly expected that 
different interference conditions exhibit a striking activation overlap as hallmark or indicator 
of a common or core neural mechanism in cognitive control to resolve interference (see 
1.3.4). Activation overlap was expected for both anterior, prefrontal areas (thought to underlie 
‘attentional control’) and posterior, parietal and temporo-occipital areas (thought to underlie 
‘attentional expression’), forming an anterior and posterior attentional system, respectively 
(see 1.3.1). In particular, the inferior frontal junction area was expected to exhibit prominent 
activation across all interference conditions, as this structure has been shown to play a pivotal 
role in the implementation of task-sets as well as in the selection of task-relevant over task-
irrelevant information (see 1.3.5). Expectations may be summarized as in the following 
general hypothesis:  
 
General hypothesis: While different kinds of cognitive interference can be well distinguished 
– both conceptually as well as operationally – they may share a common neural mechanism 
(i.e. core process) of interference resolution and accordingly may share common neural 
substrates. 
 
This assumption was motivated by prior studies’ findings showing the same pattern of 
frontoparietal activation to occur across different paradigms and conditions of interference 
involving Stroop-interference, oddball interference and response incongruency during task-
switching (see 1.3.4). This observation of common activation suggests the existence of a core 
neural process in interference processing that is recruited across multiple conflict situations or 
levels of interference. Generally, during interference processing top-down attentional control 
provides a bias favoring the processing of task-relevant information over that of task-
irrelevant information. Hence, to select task-relevant over task-irrelevant information – as a 
central aspect of attentional functioning – may be thought of as core process in the resolution 
of cognitive conflict (Weissman et al., 2005; see 1.2.1).  
Considered in more detail, the current investigation pursued three circumscribed goals that 
will be presented in the following subsections. Thereby, associated predictions in terms of 
experimental hypotheses will be stated. 
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1.4.2.1 Direct comparison of Stroop-interference and oddball-interference 
First, the current investigation was set out to directly compare Stroop-interference (see 
1.2.3.2) and oddball interference (see 1.2.3.3). Thereby, the following hypothesis was 
specified: 
 
Hypothesis: The neural mechanisms that underlie the overriding of a sensory orienting 
response to low-frequency events (i.e. oddballs) are – at least in part – the same as the neural 
mechanisms that allow to resolve Stroop-interference, i.e. to override a prepotent behavioral 
response. 
 
In particular, Stroop-incongruent trials, thought to evoke Stroop-interference, should be 
compared with word oddball trials comprising rarely occurring word-meaning. The 
comparison between Stroop-interference and interference from word oddballs was assumed to 
ensure good comparability as in both cases interference emanates from the same stimulus 
attribute (word meaning, including incongruent information in the one case and rarely 
occurring information in the other) and therefore occurs within the same processing domain. 
 
1.4.2.2 Investigation of the influence of the processing domain from which interference 
emanates: color vs. word meaning 
Second, the current investigation was planned to elucidate domain-specific effects in 
interference processing, i.e. the influence of the processing domain of the task-irrelevant 
information from which interference emanates. Thereby, the following hypothesis was 
specified: 
 
Hypothesis: Different interference effects although occurring in distinct processing domains 
engage overlapping neural activation that reflects a common neural mechanism of 
interference resolution. 
 
To test this hypothesis, oddball events in two different attribute dimensions referring to 
distinct processing domains – color and word meaning – should be created. The comparison 
between word oddballs and color oddballs was also assumed to ensure good comparability as 
the compared conditions would only differ in the dimension from which interference 
emanates (word vs. color) but not in the actual kind of interference (oddball interference in 
both cases). According to the comparison between Stroop-interference and interference from 
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word oddballs, it was expected that a putative common executive core process in interference 
processing would take form in an overlapping activation pattern. 
It is a wide-spread assumption that in interference processing prefrontal areas – forming an 
anterior executive system – alert those posterior cortical regions that are specialized for 
processing the task-relevant information (see 1.3.1). Accordingly, it was expected to find 
common activations in posterior processing areas across the compared oddball conditions 
reflecting the (amplified or boosted) processing of the common task-relevant attribute. 
However, oddball interference is conceived as orienting response to the task-irrelevant 
attribute in which the low-frequent event occurs (see 1.2.3.3). Therefore, dissociations in 
posterior regions between different oddball conditions, if present, were expected to reflect the 
orienting response to and incremental processing of the respective irrelevant oddball 
dimension. 
 
1.4.2.3 Decomposing interference during Stroop performance into different conflict 
factors 
Finally, the current work was set out to trace back Stroop interference to circumscribed 
properties of task-irrelevant information that can be conceived as ‘conflict factors’ that trigger 
different interference effects (for an explanation and working definition of the term ‘conflict 
factor’, see 1.2.1). In particular, the investigation sought to delineate the neural substrates of 
three conflict factors that refer to circumscribed properties of (task-irrelevant) lexical word 
meaning during Stroop performance: (A) response-incompatibility (i.e. word identity 
indicates an opposed response), (B) semantic incongruency (i.e. word identity is 
incongruent/contradictory, independent of its response-eligibility), and (C) task-reference 
(i.e. word identity is semantically related to the task-set, independent of its semantic 
concordance with the relevant dimension). These properties can be conclusively related to 
distinct kinds of interference that have been previously distinguished, specifically for Stroop-
performance (see 1.2.1): response-incompatibility may induce response-conflict while 
semantic incongruency may lead to semantic conflict, and finally task-reference may lead to 
competition between task-relevant and task-irrelevant information. It was expected that the 
neural correlates of the conflict factors reflect the occurrence of the related kinds of 
interference. Important to note, different conflict factors can occur simultaneously in an 
experimental condition, and thus single experimental conditions may intermingle different 
kinds of interference. For instance, it has been argued that Stroop interference contrasts, in 
particular the contrast “incongruent against congruent”, may intermingle conflict or 
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interference at the semantic level and at the motor level. In other words, as word meaning on 
incongruent trials is both semantic incongruent and response-incompatible, the contrast 
“incongruent against congruent” involve two incremental components and thus may 
intermingle semantic conflict and response conflict (see e.g. Zysset et al., 2001; van Veen & 
Carter, 2005). Following this notion, the current study sought to split activations of the Stroop 
contrast “incongruent against congruent” into two subgroups: (a) activations due to response-
incompatibility (reflecting response conflict) and (b) activations emanating from semantic 
incongruency (reflecting semantic conflict). For this, it was planned to adopt the statistical 
principle of ‘cognitive conjunction’ in order to disentangle intermingled factors. 
Some authors have discussed that attentional demands might be already enhanced whenever 
task-irrelevant information is semantically related to the current task-set due to competition 
between task-relevant and task-irrelevant information for priority in processing (e.g. Milham 
et al., 2002; see 1.2.1). The current study also set out to delineate the neural substrate of this 
third conflict factor – here referred to as task-reference – which is inherent in both 
incongruent and congruent Stroop trials and might essentially contribute to the overall Stroop 
interference effect. 
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2 Methods 
 
2.1 Data acquisition 
 
2.1.1 Subjects / Participants 
Twelve healthy and right-handed young adults have been recruited. The participant group 
comprised six men and six women with a mean age of 25,67 years (standard deviation: 1.88). 
They received a monetary payment for participating. All subjects were pre-trained a day 
before they underwent fMRI so as to ensure high accuracy levels in the task performance. 
After the preprocessing of the fMRI data three participants had to be excluded from the 
statistical analyses due to uncorrectable motion artifacts. 
 
2.1.2 Neuroimaging: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
To meet the current work’s purposes, functional brain imaging should be applied. The term 
‘functional brain imaging’ embraces the full range of techniques by which physiological 
changes that accompany brain activity are ascertained or measured. Specifically, the current 
investigation used ‘functional magnetic resonance imaging’ (fMRI), which among all 
functional brain imaging techniques is reckoned an especially flexible one that offers a wide 
range of potential applications. Furthermore, unlike other imaging techniques as ‘positron 
emission tomography’ (PET) or ‘single photon emission computed tomography’ (SPECT), 
fMRI is absolutely noninvasive so that a person can be imaged repeatedly without concern. 
Generally, the functionality of brain imaging techniques is intimately connected to the 
physiology that underlie neuronal activity, comprising electrophysiological, biochemical, and 
metabolic processes. In particular, fMRI is based on hemodynamic changes, specifically on 
local increases of blood oxygen (i.e. oxygenated hemoglobin) – commonly referred to as the 
BOLD (blood oxygenation level dependent) response – that follow brain activity. 
 
2.1.2.1 Physiological basis: local increases of blood oxygenation 
Brain activity broadly consists of neurotransmitter release that is accompanied by metabolic 
changes in neurons and glia that require energy. Energy production in the brain ultimately 
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depends on oxidative metabolism. Therefore, neuronal activity is accompanied by an 
increased local demand for delivery of oxygen that is generally met by an increased local 
blood flow, occurring seconds later. An increase in local blood flow following brain 
stimulation was firstly shown in 1890 by Charles Sherrington, who beyond this found that the 
relative proportion of oxygen extracted from this blood was significantly increased. In other 
words, the increase in oxygen delivery exceeds the increase in oxygen utilization. This 
disproportionate increase of oxygenated hemoglobin is especially important for the oxygen 
supply – i.e. the oxidative metabolism and glucose substrate utilization – of the working brain, 
as vascular oxygen diffusion capacities are significantly restricted (Buxton & Frank, 1997). 
By increasing the relative proportion of oxygenated hemoglobin in blood, the oxygen gradient 
between capillaries and circumjacent cells is increased and thereby helps to adapt the 
diffusion-limited transport to the rate of utilization. However, the thereby accompanying 
increase in blood flow leads only to a small increase in local blood volume. In brief, changes 
in the oxygenation level of the blood occur as a consequence of neuronal activity and 
therefore can be used as an indirect measure of excitatory input to neurons which is closely 
related to the cell firing rate (Logothetis et al., 2001). 
 
2.1.2.2 Physical basis: nuclear magnetic resonance  
As already evident in the term itself, MRI techniques acquire magnetic resonance. Magnetic 
resonance is a physical phenomenon arising from the interaction of atom nuclei that have a 
magnetic moment with an applied magnetic filed. Nuclei of many atoms with a nuclear “spin” 
can behave as magnetic dipoles and accordingly can assume either a high-energy state if 
oriented against the applied magnetic field, or a low-energy state if aligned with the applied 
magnetic field. Transitions between the two energy states are associated with absorption or 
emission of energy in the radiofrequency range. The frequency of the energy emitted by an 
excited nucleus is proportional to the magnetic field at the nucleus which is primarily 
determined by the magnetic field applied in the imaging experiment. Generally, hydrogen 
nuclei perform spins around their axis which give them an angular moment. Furthermore, as 
protons are positive charges, a current loop perpendicular to the rotation axis is created so that 
the proton generates a magnetic field. The joint effect of the angular moment and the 
generated magnetic field is that protons get a magnetic dipole moment. Importantly, normally 
one will not experience any magnetic field from a volume of nuclei, because the magnetic 
dipole moments of the single protons are oriented randomly and in average equalize one 
another. If an external magnetic field (B0) is applied, protons are forced to align their spins in 
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parallel (or anti-parallel) to the applied magnetic field with an angular frequency w0, referred 
to as Larmor frequency. The Larmor frequency is defined as  
w0 = Gamma * B0, 
where gamma is a constant called gyromagnetic ratio, whose value depends on the type of 
nucleus. That means that under a given magnetic field (B0), the resulting resonance frequency 
(w0) is specific to the present kind of nucleus, a phenomenon which is used in ‘spectroscopic‘ 
MR techniques. In MRI one apply a stationary magnetic field in order to obtain some control 
over the single protons which is necessary to create resonance that one can record. On the 
static magnetic field, magnetic pulses are superimposed that tip the net magnetization vector 
of the nuclear spins away from the equilibrium alignment with the applied magnetic field. 
Thereby, protons get from a low- to a high-energy state by absorbing energy. When a 
magnetic pulse ends (i.e. the energy source is switched off), a relaxation process will start 
immediately during which protons return to the equilibrium state by emitting the afore 
absorbed energy. Emitting and absorbing radiofrequency energy – which is magnetic 
resonance – if recorded can be processed into a MR image. The relaxation process in 
resonance can be described by different time constants which are used to generate contrast in 
MRI. The biological parameters T1 and T2 are tissue dependent and therefore yield the 
possibility to separate different tissue types in the human brain. During BOLD-fMRI, T2* 
effects are recorded which are associated to the fact that deoxyhemoglobin is magnetic 
whereas oxygenated hemoglobin is not. Following, the three time parameters used to generate 
MRI contrasts are presented in a bit more detail.  
(A) T1 period: spin-lattice relaxation time 
How efficient the spin relaxation occurs is determined by the interaction of the spins with 
their surrounding environment referred to as ‘lattice’. During the spin-lattice relaxation, the 
high-energy state protons exchange energy with circumjacent protons which results in thermal 
energy. This process has a rate constant 1/T1, where T1 is the so-called ‘spin-lattice 
relaxation time’ and represents an exponential process. If excitation pulses are applied more 
rapidly than allows for full relaxation, then the proportion of spins that can be excited is lower 
and the resonance signal decreases. This provides one source of imaging contrast, as the T1 
for a water molecule depends on the chemical environment, which varies for different parts of 
the brain, for instance is longer for water in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) than for water in tissue. 
By shortening the inter pulse delay (or TR = time of repetition) in a pulse sequence, signal 
from parts of the brain with a shorter T1 relaxation time will increase relative to signal from 
parts of the brain with longer T1 relaxation time. Excited spins regain 66% of their 
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equilibrium magnetization over one T1 period (and 95% over three T1 periods). In principle, 
if one could observe the signal from an single resonating nucleus, it would decay with a time 
constant equal to T1.  
(B) T2 period: spin-spin relaxation time 
Generally, during MRI one is observing emissions from huge numbers of spins 
simultaneously while single nuclei continuously experience small local changes in magnetic 
field. These shifting fields allow an exchange of energy between nuclei which leads to a loss 
of coherence in the phases of their resonance emissions. This loss of coherence leads to an 
exponential loss of intensity for the summed resonance signal from all of the nuclei together, 
which is described by the so-called ‘spin-spin’ or T2 relaxation time. The T2 is an intrinsic 
property of nuclei in a particular chemical environment. By increasing the delay before signal 
detection in a pulse sequence (i.e. lengthening the TE = echo time), signal from tissue with a 
longer T2 (e.g. gray matter) will be increased relative to tissues with shorter T2 (e.g. white 
matter).  
(C) T2* relaxation time 
The rate of decay of signal is faster if there are local field gradients that the molecules can 
diffuse through over the time course of a single TE. As molecules move into regions of 
different local fields, their resonance frequencies change slightly, lowering the coherence of 
the nuclear spins. This leads to a more rapid decay of the net signal. In the presence of local 
magnetic field inhomogeneities, the rate of signal decay is expressed by the T2* relaxation 
time. In regions of rapidly changing local magnetic fields, the T2* can be substantially shorter 
than the T2. This provides yet another mechanism for generating contrast that is especially 
important for functional imaging. T2 refers to changes of the signal inside a vessel whereas 
T2* refers to changes of the signal in the tissue immediately surrounding a vessel. Changes in 
both T2 and T2* relaxation times for intra- and extravascular water become greater with 
higher imaging magnetic field strength. However, for intravascular water the increase is linear 
and for extravascular water the increase is exponential (Ogawa et al., 1993). Consequently, at 
higher magnetic field strength the contribution of contrast change in the brain tissue increases 
relative to that from blood in vessels (Gati et al., 1997). 
 
2.1.2.3 Linking hemodynamic changes to magnetic properties 
In blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) fMRI, the imaging contrast arises as a 
consequence of changes in the local magnetic susceptibility following the higher ratio of 
oxyhemoglobin to deoxyhemoglobin in local draining venules and veins that accompanies 
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neuronal activation (Ogawa et al., 1993). In contrast, during perfusion MRI – a method much 
less sensitive as BOLD fMRI – there is a direct measuring of the blood flow response. 
Oxyhemoglobin has no substantial magnetic properties, i.e. is diamagnetic, but 
deoxyhemoglobin is strongly paramagnetic (Pauling & Coryell, 1936). Thus, variation in the 
relative proportion of oxyhemoglobin leads to changes in magnetic susceptibility. In BOLD 
fMRI, deoxyhemoglobin serves as intrinsic paramagnetic contrast agent that has only little 
effect on T1. Accordingly, in case of local increases of oxygen level, T2 weighted gradient-
echo EPI (‘echo planar imaging’) sequences and T2* weighted spin-echo EPI sequences, 
which are both highly susceptibility sensitive, will show an increase in signal (see below 
2.1.2.5). 
 
2.1.2.4 Relevant parameters of an MR-sequence 
The nature of a signal from an uncontrolled relaxation process would make it impossible to 
separate the influence of the different parameters, and accordingly different hemodynamic 
states or tissue types could not be distinguished. Therefore, one exerts control over the 
relaxation process by introducing a dependency of one of the biological parameters in the 
recorded signal. In other words, the MR-signals are weighted upon one of the biological 
parameters. To create controlled relaxation processes one changes the way in which the spins 
are excited and observed using different ‘pulse sequences’, e.g. a T2-weighted spin-echo 
sequence or the Inversion-Recovery method for T1-weightened images. There are three 
principle parameters of pulse sequences that can be varied to generate contrast: 
(a) the ‘flip-angle’ (extent to which the net magnetization vector of the nuclear spins is 
tipped away from the equilibrium alignment with the applied magnetic field, varied by 
the energy per pulse put into the sample), 
(b) the rate at which pulses are applied (the ‘pulse rate’) which increases as the TR (‘time of 
repetition’) interval becomes shorter (the shorter the TR, the less time is allowed for T1 
relaxation), and 
(c) the time that is waited before the resonance is detected after excitation, refereed to as TE 
(‘echo time’) (nuclei that have a shorter T2 will relatively less signal, the longer the TE 
value used). 
 
2.1.2.5 EPI: Echo planar imaging 
‘Echo planar imaging’ (EPI) is a data acquisition strategy that allows for a very rapid data 
acquisition. The EPI method was originally described by Mansfield (1977). The basic concept 
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of this method is that multiple rather than single image lines are acquired after spin 
preparation. Conventional imaging sequences record one slice of a volume each phase 
encoding step so that the time required to acquire a complete volume is determined by the 
product of TR and the number of slices. In contrast, during EPI sequences all slices of a 
volume are acquired in a single TR period. Hence, what distinguishes the EPI sequence from 
other sequences is that all the signal information needed to reconstruct an entire image is 
obtained in a “single shot”. Therefore, successful EPI requires that the time take to read a 
single image line is significantly smaller than T2* which necessitates strong gradient fields 
with rapid switching capability. There are two principal EPI sequences, ‘gradient-echo’ EPI 
and ‘spin-echo’ EPI. In both sequences, the readout of multiple slices occurs from a single 
‘free induction decay’ (FID), while the signal decay occurs with the time constant T2 for 
gradient-echo EPI and with the time constant T2* for spin-echo EPI. 
 
2.1.2.6 Imaging location: the generation of MR-images from MR-signals  
In order to generate MR-images, it is necessary to assign defined MR-signals to 
circumscribed locations in the brain. Methods to image the location of resonating nuclei in a 
sample in principle all use the same idea of “spatial frequency encoding”. Thereby, one 
employs small magnetic field gradients that are superimposed on the larger homogeneous 
static magnetic field of the imaging magnet. The relative positions of molecules along the 
smaller gradient field are measured simply from differences in resonance frequency, as a 
given point in space is equivalent to a given frequency. 
 
2.1.2.7 Time course of the BOLD response 
Generally, the time course of the BOLD response in a given region of activation is complex, 
and different time points of the time course may provide distinct information. BOLD time 
course is best defined for the primary visual cortex (Ernst & Hennig, 1994). Generally, there 
is an initial small decrease referred to as ‘early dip’ that evolves over the first second. The 
early dip is hypothesized to arise from the rapid deoxygenation of capillary blood following 
the greater oxygen utilization associated with greater synaptic activity. Over the next two till 
four seconds, there is a progressive increase in signal intensity due to the increase in blood 
flow which exceeds the increase in local oxygen utilization so that the oxyhemoglobin / 
deoxyhemoglobin ratio increases. For a simple stimulus that does not cause physiological 
habituation, the signal change is maintained on a relatively constant level for the period of 
stimulation (Bandettini et al., 1997). After the stimulation stops, both blood flow and the 
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oxyhemoglobin / deoxyhemoglobin ratio decay. Particularly, after the stimulation stops, the 
BOLD signal decreases over a few seconds to a level below the initial baseline, referred to as 
‘undershoot’, from which it recovers slowly over a further few seconds. Altogether, even for 
brief stimulus presentations, it takes about 12 to 18 seconds from the onset to the final return 
of the signal intensity to baseline. 
 
2.1.2.8 FMRI data acquisition in the current investigation 
Imaging in the current work was performed on a 3-T MRI scanner (Bruker Medspec 30/100; 
Bruker BioSpin MRI GmbH, Ettlingen, Germany) with a standard birdcage headcoil. 
Nineteen axial slices (voxel size 3 X 3 X 5 mm3, distance factor 0.2) were positioned in 
parallel to the AC-PC plane (AC = anterior commissure; PC posterior commissure), covering 
the entire brain. Prior to the functional scans, anatomical MDEFT (modified driven 
equilibrium Fourier transform pulse sequence) slices and EPI-T1 (echo-planar imaging, t1-
weighted) slices were obtained. These measurements were followed by three runs of a single-
shot, gradient EPI sequence (TR 1.75 s, TE 30 ms, flip angle 90°, filed of view 192 mm, 64 X 
64 matrix) each acquiring a total of 535 image volumes. Functional brain imaging was 
synchronized with stimulus presentation by means of ERTS (Experimental Run Time System, 
Version 3.11, BeriSoft Cooperation, Frankfurt am Main, Germany). In a separate session, a 
high-resolution structural scan (3D MDEFT) was obtained for each subject. Importantly, there 
was no whole-numbered or fixed relation between image acquisition and presentation rate, so 
that the hemodynamic response was sampled at different time points (i.e. was oversampled). 
Thus, there was no need to insert jittered inter-stimulus intervals for an exact estimation of the 
hemodynamic response. 
 
2.1.3 Experimental setting and paradigm 
2.1.3.1 Stimulation 
The stimulation was computer-based using the software package ERTS that run on a PC in the 
scanner control room. While subjects laid in the scanner tube (supine position; head-first), 
stimuli have been projected by a video beamer onto a small mirror that was positioned above 
the subjects’ head in a distance that ensured clear and relaxed vision. 
 
 
Methods  39 
2.1.3.2 Task paradigm 
For the current work’s purpose, a special version of the Stroop paradigm (see 1.2.2.2) was 
adopted in which participants classified colored word stimuli according to font size rather 
than according to ink color as it is the case in most other task versions. Subjects had to 
classify targets by a forced choice – left or right – button press response using either the 
middle or index finger of the right hand. They were instructed to make a left response if the 
word stimuli appeared in big font size and to make a right response for small font size stimuli. 
Unlike other Stroop paradigms, there was no task related to word meaning, and it was 
explicitly pointed out to the subjects that they would have to ignore it for good performance. 
Participants were further instructed to be fast but accurate. Because the current work should 
be directly linked up with a prior neuroimaging study called ‘Perseus’ (see 1.3.4), the 
implementation of a color oddball condition – consisting of a rarely occurring task-irrelevant 
and response-ineligible stimulus color – was of primary interest. On the other hand, it was 
impossible to operationalize color oddballs within the commonly used color Stroop task, 
because here color serves as task-relevant (i.e. response-indicating) dimension and 
accordingly cannot assume a response-ineligible value. Therefore, the described ‘size Stroop 
task’ was created in which all conditions of interest could be implemented and compared. 
Nevertheless, the experimental task also included color Stroop trials and accordingly 
consisted of a ‘cued task-switching paradigm’ (see 1.2.3.1) in order to keep the overall 
attentional demands on a higher level as during single task performance. 
Note: In particular, due to the task switches the cognitive system was expected to keep a 
higher flexibility and therefore a higher distractibility which should reinforce the oddball 
effect which actually is a distraction effect. During single task conditions, on the other hand, 
control efforts to shield the one relevant dimension are sustained and thus, assumably, get 
very strong so that there is only little distractibility (and hence probably a reduced sensitivity 
for oddballs) which is achieved at the cost of an attenuated cognitive flexibility. 
During the color-task, blue ink color was mapped to a left response and yellow ink color to a 
right response. It is important to emphasize that color task trials did not enter into the 
statistical analyses and that hence the current work’s results presentation is restricted to the 
size-task that comprised all conditions of interest (see also below, 2.2.3). 
In the beginning of each trial a cue lasting for 500 ms signalized which task had to be 
performed on the upcoming stimulus. A big letter F for “Farbe” (which is the German 
translation for “color”) indicated the color-task, while a big letter G for “Größe” (which is the 
German translation for “size”) indicated the size-task. Targets appeared after a short delay of 
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250 ms and lasted for 750 ms. RTs were recorded within a time period of 1500 ms with begin 
of the target presentation till the onset of the next cue. Thus, the total trial duration was 2250 












































Figure 3: Task paradigm and trial constitution. 
 
 
2.1.3.3 Design and experimental conditions 
Six basic experimental conditions of interest were created that occurred in both tasks equally 
frequent so that the experimental design was completely symmetrical. During congruent 
(CO) trials, word meaning matched the value of the currently relevant dimension, for instance 
the word BIG printed in big letters in the size-task, or the word BLUE printed in blue color in 
the color-task. During response-eligible incongruent / response-incongruent (RI) trials, 
word meaning denoted the opposed-mapped value of the currently relevant dimension, for 
instance the word SMALL printed in big letters in the size-task, or the word BLUE printed in 
yellow color in the color-task. During response-ineligible incongruent / semantically 
incongruent (SI) trials, word meaning was likewise incongruent with the currently relevant 
dimension but – in contrast to the RI condition – was not mapped to any response, i.e. was 
response-ineligible. Specifically, for the color-task the color word GREEN and for the size-
task the size-associated word BROAD were presented, which are both response-ineligible (i.e. 
not part of the task-set). Word-oddball (OW) trials comprised rarely occurring words that 
were semantically unrelated to the tasks, while the vast majority of trials comprised response-
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eligible or response-ineligible color or size words. Ten oddball words were implemented 
comprising of KALT, WARM, LAUT, BRAV, VOLL, LEER, SPÄT, FRÜH, HELL, and 
FERN (English translations: cold, warm, good (in terms of “well behaved”), full, empty, late, 
early, bright, and distal) which were matched for word length and syllable number with the 
prevalent word stimuli. Each oddball word was presented with a frequency of one in every 
112 trials (~0.9%) while each response-eligible and response-ineligible color word or size 
word appeared with a frequency of one in every six trials (~17%). Furthermore, another low-
frequency condition was created in which the oddball event occurred in the currently 
irrelevant dimension and that therefore differed for the color-task and the size-task. Regarding 
the size-task, Color-oddball (OC) trials consisted of rarely occurring red colored stimuli 
while the vast majority of stimuli appeared in yellow or blue ink color. Regarding the color-
task, Size-oddball trials consisted of rarely occurring mid-size stimuli while the vast majority 
of stimuli appeared in small or big font size. Important to note, the color-task could not 
include color oddballs (i.e. OC trials), since the oddball color red was response-ineligible and 
participants consequently could not have given a response on OC trials presented during the 
color-task. Similarly, the size-task could not include size oddballs because the mid-size value, 
just like the red color, was response-ineligible. Both, red colored and mid-size stimuli 
appeared with a frequency of one in every 32 trials (~3%) while each other color and size 
value (blue and yellow as well as big and small font size) appeared on virtually every second 
trial (~49%). Noteworthy, while Color-oddballs and Size-oddballs occurred with a different 
frequency, the frequency ratio (i.e. relative frequency) of rare values (i.e. oddball values) to 
prevalent values was roughly identical for the color and the word dimension (~1:17). 
Oddballs were distributed within the stimulation sequence in a pseudorandomized manner that 
ensured that no oddball trial followed another oddball trial, and furthermore that oddball trials 
were preceded by every other trial type equally often. Size-oddball trials – just as all other 
trials of the color-task – did not enter into the statistical analyses (see 2.2.3) and were 
implemented only to keep the design balanced (i.e. symmetrical) across the two tasks. Neutral 
/ semantically unrelated (SU) trials included the normally frequent and response-ineligible 
color word “GREEN” in the size-task and the normally frequent and response-ineligible size 
word “BROAD” in the color-task, so that word meaning was semantically unrelated to the 
task at hand. SU trials should primarily serve as contrast condition for the oddball conditions 
– Color-oddballs and Word-oddballs – and therefore were also termed ‘oddball control 
condition’. 
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Important to note, all trial types mentioned so far – with the exception of Color- and Size-
oddballs – were ‘basically congruent’, i.e. color and size were mapped to the same response. 
But, there were also ‘basically incongruent’ trials during which color and size were mapped 
to opposed responses. Specifically, basically incongruent trials comprised big font size 
combined with yellow color or small font size combined with blue color. However, basically 
incongruent trials were not relevant for the current work’s purposes and had been included for 
task-strategic reasons only, in order to prevent subjects from focusing on the same dimension 
in both tasks, which would be a “successful” strategy if only basically congruent trials were 
presented. Each trial type, with the exception of the oddball trials, appeared 36 times in both 
the color-task and the shape-task. Word-oddballs trials appeared 10 times in both tasks, while 
Color-oddballs and Size-oddballs appeared 36 times in the size task and 36 times in the color 
task, respectively. Switch trials, i.e. the first trials after a task switch, were excluded from the 
analyses because cognitive (re)configuration processes during task switches are not part of the 
current work’s purposes. The experimental stimulation was fully counterbalanced in that 
every color value, size value and word as well as their combinations occurred equally often 
within the experimental course, while the included low-frequency (i.e. oddball) events 
represented intended exceptions. Altogether, the experimental stimulation included 1168 trials 
which participants performed on three separate blocks of equal length. Conditions were 
presented in a counterbalanced order, generated to ensure that each trial type followed every 
other trial type equally often. Labelings of the experimental conditions and associated stimuli 
are depicted in the tables of Figure 4 and Figure 5 for the color-task and the size-task, 
respectively.  
 






GELB (YELLOW) Stroop-incongruency 
(response-eligible) 
BLUE (BLUE) 
GREEN (GREEN) Stroop-incongruency 
(response-ineligible) 
GREEN (GREEN) 
BLAU (BLUE) Stroop-congruency 
  
GELB (YELLOW) 
LAUT (LOUD) Word-oddball 
KALT (COLD) 
BREIT (BROAD) Size-oddball 
  BREIT (BROAD) 
BREIT (BROAD) Semantically unrelated / 
Oddball control 
BREIT (BROAD) 
BREIT (BROAD) Basic incongruency 
BREIT (BROAD) 





KLEIN (SMALL) Stroop-incongruency 
(response-eligible) RI GROSS (BIG) 
BREIT (BROAD) Stroop-incongruency 
(response-ineligible) SI BREIT (BROAD) 
GROSS (BIG) Stroop-congruency CO 
KLEIN (SMALL) 
LAUT (LOUD) Word-oddball OW
KALT (COLD) 
GRÜN (GREEN) Color-oddball OC 
GRÜN (GREEN) 
GRÜN (GREEN) Semantically unrelated / 
Oddball control SU GRÜN (GREEN) 
GRÜN (GREEN) Basic incongruency 
GRÜN (GREEN) 
Figure 5: Table depicts condition labels and corresponding target stimuli of the size-task. 
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2.2 Data analysis 
 
2.2.1 Neuroimaging data 
 
2.2.1.1 Preprocessing of the fMRI data 
Using the SPM2 software package (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), the functional images 
acquired were realigned, corrected for motion artifacts, slicetime acquisition differences, 
global signal intensity variation, and low-frequency fluctuations, normalized into the standard 
stereotactic space (using the MNI template) and spatially smoothed with a 9 mm and 8 mm 
full-width-half-maximum Gaussian kernel for group and single subject analyses, respectively. 
Based on the General Linear Model approach for time-series data, a design matrix was created 
in which the experimental conditions were modeled as different events in time and convolved 
with a hemodynamic response function accounting for the delay of the BOLD (blood oxygen 
level dependent) response. 
 
2.2.1.2 Statistical procedures: cognitive subtraction and cognitive conjunction 
Consequent to the preprocessing, the fMRI data were statistically analyzed by adopting two 
basic statistical principles, cognitive subtraction and cognitive conjunction, that will be 
presented in the following subsections. 
 
2.2.1.2.1 Cognitive subtraction: condition contrasts 
Generally, cognitive subtraction comprises the definition of an experimental condition and a 
baseline condition so that the two conditions differ in only one cognitive component (i.e. 
cognitive process), which is the one that is actually sought to be investigated. Consequently, 
brain regions demonstrating (stronger) increases in vascular activity associated with the 
experimental compared to the baseline condition are interpreted as neural substrate of the 
differential (i.e. incremental) component (Price and Friston, 1997). In the current 
investigation, t-contrasts – corresponding to one sample t-tests – were performed for each 
subject separately. Thereby, the computed subtractions comprised both single contrasts and 
interaction contrasts. Generally, single contrasts determine activations that significantly differ 
between two conditions of an experiment, and in the current work have been defined in order 
to delineate neural activation related to the different interference (i.e. incongruency and 
oddball) effects. In a second step, interaction contrasts were performed so as to compare 
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interference effects against each other. In particular, interaction contrasts consisted of 
“contrasted contrasts” in terms of chained subtractions. For instance, if one wishes to compare 
two contrasts A–B and C–D, the subtractive chaining to an interaction contrast would result in 
(A–B)–(C–D) which corresponds to A–B–C+D, taking into account rules for dissolving 
mathematical operator brackets. In this way, Stroop-interference was compared against Word-
oddball interference and Color-oddball interference against Word-oddball interference. 
Thereby, each comparison (i.e. interaction contrast) was performed in both directions. 
Interaction contrasts should reveal areas that significantly differ between the single t-contrasts 
and thereby help to separate common from unique activations of the respective interference 
effects. For group statistics, random effect analyses (Holmes & Friston, 1998) were performed 
on single subject contrast images and were thresholded at p<.005, uncorrected. Essentially, 
random effect analyses identify those brain regions that are consistently activated across 
different subjects, while subjects are treated as random factors – giving random effect 
analyses their name – so that results can be generalized to the entire population to which 
subjects belong. 
 
2.2.1.2.2 Cognitive conjunction: conjoint condition contrasts 
In subtraction designs, one may encounter the problem that it is impossible to set an 
appropriate condition pair that isolates a certain component of interest. Specifically, condition 
contrasts may intermingle different incremental components (i.e. may confound the 
component of interest with other ones) so that a valid interpretation of the found pattern of 
differential activation as reflecting the neural substrate of the component of interest is 
precluded. Cognitive conjunction is in part designed to resolve this issue (Price & Friston, 
1997; Friston et al., 1999). Essentially, cognitive conjunctions identify regions that are 
commonly activated across two (or more) contrasts. In other words, conjunction analyses 
identify regions in which each of two (or more) condition pairs yield differential vascular (i.e. 
BOLD) responses. If the conjoint contrasts share one – and only one – common incremental 
component (the component of interest), the delineated pattern of common activation is 
interpreted as reflecting the neural substrate of this component. Incremental components or 
cognitive operations of the contrasts other than the component of interest (i.e. confounded 
variables) can be disregarded without concern as long as these components are not shared by 
the conjoint contrasts. 
Regarding the current investigation, conjunction analyses were performed by using a random-
effect statistical model in which the single-subject contrast images were entered (see above, 
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2.2.1.2.1) and were thresholded at p<.005, uncorrected. Specifically, conjunction analyses 
were applied according to the revised statistical test introduced by Tom Nichols and 
colleagues (Nichols et al., 2005). This test allows for a valid conjunction interference, i.e. 
tests for a true logical AND, while older versions refer to an inappropriate null hypothesis for 
a suchlike straightforward interpretation.  
 
2.2.1.3 Defined contrasts and contrast conjunctions 
2.2.1.3.1 Single contrasts to determine interference-related activation 
Three different single contrasts have been computed in order to delineate brain activations 
related to (1) Stroop-interference, (2) Word-oddball interference, and (3) Color-oddball 
interference. Ad (1): Neural activity related to Stroop-interference was determined by 
contrasting response-incongruent trials against congruent trials (RI-CO). Ad (2): Activations 
specific for interference emanating from Word-oddballs have been determined by the contrast 
Word-oddball trials against neutral (semantically unrelated) trials (OW-SU). Ad (3): Brain 
activations associated with interference from Color-oddballs were determined by the contrast 
Color-oddball trials against neutral (semantically unrelated) trials (OC-SU). 
Additionally, the contrast response-incongruent trials against neutral (semantically 
unrelated) trials (RI-SU) was computed so that the neural effects of incongruity and oddballs 
could be compared as derived from the same baseline. 
 
2.2.1.3.2 Interaction contrasts to determine differences between interference effects 
In a second step, pairings of the considered t-contrasts have been compared by means of so-
called interaction contrasts. Interaction contrasts in the current investigation consisted of 
subtractive connections of two single contrasts, i.e. of chained subtractions (see 2.2.1.2.1). 
Interaction contrasts have been computed to reveal areas that significantly differ between the 
single t-contrasts so as to separate common from unique activations of the respective 
interference effects. Thereby, subtractions have been conducted in both directions, each, in 
order to isolate activations that are significantly stronger in one contrast (i.e. for one 
interference effect) compared to other, and vice versa. Concretely, Stroop-interference has 
been contrasted against Word-oddball interference (corresponding to RI-CO-OW+SU and 
OW-SU-RI+CO) as well as Color-oddball interference against Word-oddball interference 
(corresponding to OW-SU-OC+SU = OW-OC and OC-SU-OW+SU = OC-OW). 
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2.2.1.3.3 Conjoint contrasts to determine activations related to conflict factors 
Conjunction analyses (see 2.2.1.2.2) have been conducted to delineate the influence of 
circumscribed conflict factors that may independently contribute to the overall Stroop-
interference effect. In particular, set pairings of conjoint contrasts should separate activations 
of the contrast RI-CO into two subgroups: (a) activations related to response-incompatibility 
and (b) activations related to semantic incongruency. The table in Figure 6 allocates conflict 
factors of interest to experimental conditions as well as to condition contrasts respectively 
contrast conjunctions. Thereby, conditions are arranged in an hierarchical order wherein each 
next “higher” condition includes only one incremental component, from SU including no 
factor of interest through RI including all three factors of interest. While the contrast RI-CO 
arguably intermingles ‘response-incompatibility’ and ‘semantic incongruency’ (see 1.4.2.3), 
the contrasts RI-SI and SI-CO isolate response-incompatibility and semantic incongruence, 
respectively. Accordingly, it was expected that activations of the contrast RI-CO that reflect 
response-incompatibility were also observable in the contrast RI-SI. Similarly, activations of 
the contrast RI-CO emanating from semantic incongruency should be equally present in the 
contrast RI-SI. Based on this allocation of conflict factors to condition contrasts, contrast 
conjunctions have been defined. Thereby, common activations of RI-CO with RI-SI have 
been attributed to response-incompatibility whereas common activations of RI-CO with SI-
CO have been interpreted as emanating from semantic incongruency. To determine 
activations specific to ‘task-reference’, the third conflict factor of interest, the single contrast 
CO-SU was computed, that includes no other incremental component. 
 
Figure 6: Table allocates conflict factors to experimental conditions (= included, X= not 














experimental conditions  
conflict factors 
response–
incompatibility X X X  RI-CO ∩ RI-SI 
semantic 
incongruency X X   RI-CO ∩ SI-CO 
task-reference X    CO-SU  
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2.2.2 Behavioral data 
Statistical analyses of the behavioral data used SPSS 11.5 for Windows and were conducted 
after wrong responses had been excluded. Reaction times (RTs) have been aggregated across 
subjects and conditions. Consequently, based on the GLM (General Linear Model), the data 
were analyzed by a repeated measures ANOVA (analysis of variance), thresholded at p<.05, 
as omnibus test for estimating the global effect of the experimental variation on the RT data. 
Consequently, single t-contrasts (using paired t-tests) for pairwise comparisons of the 
experimental conditions have been conducted to determine single interference effects. 
Specifically, single comparisons comprised the following five contrasts: RI-CO, SI-CO, SU-
CO, OW-SU, and OC-SU. Statistical inferences relied on one-tailed probabilities as the 
compared conditions (i.e. condition contrasts) were associated with definite a-priori 
expectancies, assuming prolonged RTs for interference conditions compared to non-
interference or baseline conditions (see 1.4.1). 
 
2.2.3 Restriction of the statistical analyses to the size-task 
All results that will be presented in the following section exclusively refer to the size-task as 
color-task trials did not enter into the statistical analyses of either the behavioral or the 
neuroimaging data. The reason for this was that color oddball trials could only be 
implemented in the size-task as the color-task, in which color serves as task-relevant 
dimension, could not include a response-ineligible color value (see also 2.1.2.3). The 
restriction of the analyses to the size-task, which included all relevant conditions that are 
needed to address the current work’s purposes, should ensure a good comparability among all 
compared trial types. Besides, size oddballs within the color task were not expected to 
produce a significant effect at either the behavioral or neural level, because the mid-size value 
did not represent a salient deviation from big or small font size stimuli whereas red color 
oddballs clearly contrasted with the prevalent blue or yellow stimuli. Rather, Size-oddballs 
were created just as ‘counterpart’ for Color-oddballs in order to keep the design balanced 
across both tasks. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Behavioral results 
All subjects reached high accuracy levels [mean percentages: correct responses 94.9%; wrong 
responses 3.3%; missing responses 1.8%]. The bar chart in Figure 7 depicts mean RTs and 
corresponding standard errors of the experimental conditions [means ± standard error: RI, 471 
ms ± 4.9; SI, 459 ms ± 4.7; CO, 452 ms ± 4.3; SU, 456 ms ± 5.3; OW = 478 ms ± 12.8; OC, 






























Figure 7: Behavioral data. The bar chart depicts mean reaction times and respective standard 
errors of the experimental conditions. Data exhibited significant effects (i.e. interference 
effects) for Stroop-incongruency (response-eligible incongruent trials), Word-oddballs and 
Color-oddballs. Statistical effects were determined by paired t-tests, thresholded at p<.05. 
 
The data showed, primarily at the descriptive level, that RTs on interference trials (i.e. RI, SI, 
OW, and OC) were generally prolonged as compared to non-interference trials (CO and SU). 
Then, the omnibus ANOVA across all conditions appeared significant at p=.017 (under 
sphericity assumption) indicating that the descriptive differences were at least in part reliable. 
T-contrasts appeared significant for the comparisons RI-CO (p=.025), OW-SU (p=.026), and 
OC-SU (p=.004), indicating a behavioral effect for Stroop-interference, interference from 
word oddballs, and interference from color oddballs. On the other hand, the contrast SI-CO 
did not yield a significant result (p=.149) and therefore provided no evidence for substantial 
interference in the SI condition. Finally, the contrast CO-SU was likewise not significant 
(p=.352) and hence yielded no evidence for substantial facilitation by congruent word 
meaning. 
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In conclusion, the behavioral data clearly indicated that the experimental manipulation within 
the adopted task paradigm was indeed effective in inducing interference. The following 
subsections present how the effects observed at the behavioral level were reflected in the 
neuroimaging data. 
 
3.2 Neuroimaging results 
 
3.2.1 Neural activations related to different interference effects 
 
3.2.1.1 Activations related to Stroop-interference 
Stroop-interference – as represented by the contrast “Stroop-incongruency vs. Stroop-
congruency” – elicited activation particularly in the left premotor cortex (BA 6) and left 
motor cortex (BA 4) along the precentral and central sulcus, in the pre-supplementary motor 
area (pre-SMA; BA 6/32), in a subgenual portion of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 
24), as well as in the bilateral anterior insula (BA 13) and in a more posterior part of the left 
insula (BA 13). Further, a significant signal change was observed in the left postcentral 
(somatosensory) cortex (BA 1/3), in the bilateral cuneus (BA 19), the right occipito-temporal 
cortex (BA 37/39), and the cerebellum, as well as in the right basal ganglia and thalamus. The 
reported activations are listed in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 8A. 
The contrast response-incongruent trials against neutral (semantically unrelated) trials (RI-
SU) revealed significant activation in the right posterior lateral PFC, a region previously 
referred to as inferior frontal junction area (IFJA) (see 1.3.5) [t-value (coordinates): 3.80 (45 6 
18)] as well as in the ventral premotor cortex (BA 6) [t-value (coordinates): 3.80 (-60 6 36) / 
3.64 (-54 3 39)]. 
 
3.2.1.2 Activations related to interference from Word-oddballs 
Activations associated with Word-oddball interference have been determined by the contrast 
OW-SU. This contrast showed significant activation bilaterally in the frontolateral cortex, 
including bilateral activations along the posterior part of the inferior frontal sulcus (IFS) 
belonging to the IFJA, in an anterior portion of the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; BA 45), 
as well as in the right anterior insular cortex (BA 13). Furthermore, the contrast revealed 
significantly enhanced brain activity in posterior frontomedian cortex (BA 32) in the vicinity 
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of the cingulate sulcus, in the left precentral or premotor cortex (BA 6), and bilaterally in the 
temporo-polar cortex (TPC; BA 21/38) as well as in the left posterior insula (BA 13). Finally, 
word oddball interference was associated with activation in posterior cortical regions 
including bilateral parietal cortices along the intraparietal sulcus (IPS; BA 7), the left fusiform 
gyrus (FG; BA 37), the bilateral occipito-temporal cortex (BA 39) as well as bilateral 
extrastriate visual cortices (BA 18). The reported activations are listed in Table 1 (and Table 
2) and depicted in Figure 8B. 
 
3.2.1.3 Activations related to interference from Color-oddballs 
Color-oddballs produced neural activation – as revealed by the contrast OC-SU – throughout 
a largely distributed network of regions, comprising numerous bilateral cortical and 
subcortical structures. Lateral prefrontal activations were observed bilaterally in the anterior 
IFG, comprising pars triangularis and pars orbitalis (BA 45, BA 47), and bilaterally in the 
posterior IFG belonging to the IFJA. Furthermore, color oddball interference produced 
significantly enhanced activation in the frontomedian wall, particularly in the superior frontal 
gyrus (SFG; BA 8/9) as well as in a more ventral region in the vicinity of the cingulate sulcus 
(BA 32). Color-oddballs further elicited strong activation in the bilateral TPC and in parietal 
cortices bilaterally along the IPS. Finally, Color-oddballs involved mainly left-
hemispherically posterior processing regions, specifically the left FG (BA 37), left lingual 
gyrus (BA 19), left occipito-temporal cortex (BA 39), as well as bilateral extrastriate visual 
cortices (BA 18) and bilateral precuneus cortex (BA 19). The reported activations are listed in 
Table 2 and depicted in Figure 8C. 
 
3.2.2 Neural activations differentiating between different kinds of interference 
In a second step, pairwise comparisons of the presented single contrasts have been conducted 
in order to separate common from unique activations of the respective interference effects, i.e. 
to delineate activations that are specific to single interference effects. For this purpose, 
bidirectional interaction contrasts (see 2.2.1.3.2) have been computed to delineate activations 
that are significantly stronger for one of the pairwise contrasts as compared to the other, and 
vice versa. 
 
3.2.2.1 Comparison between Stroop-interference and interference from Word-oddballs 
Basically, Stroop-interference and Word-oddball interference exhibited quite distinct patterns 
of neural activation. There was only sparse activation overlap observed for the left premotor 
 
Results  52 
cortex, the left posterior insula, and in the more anterior right insular cortex. Furthermore, 
there was overlapping activation in the postcentral gyrus that, important to note, appeared to 
be significantly stronger for Stroop-interference as for Word-oddballs. Activations specific to 
Stroop-interference was observed in the left precentral gyrus (dorsal premotor cortex), in the 
pre-SMA, in the subgenual ACC, in the left anterior insular cortex, in the bilateral cuneus, in 
the right cerebellum, as well as in the right basal ganglia and thalamus. Reversely, only Word-
oddballs activated the right anterior and posterior inferior frontal cortex and the bilateral 
IFJA, bilateral TPC, the posterior portions of the right inferior and superior temporal cortex, 
the left FG, as well as bilaterally the IPS and extrastriate visual cortices. The reported 
activations are listed in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 8A/B/D. 
 
3.2.2.2 Comparison between interference from Word-oddballs and interference from 
Color-oddballs 
Oddballs in both the word and color dimension produced signal changes in a wide range of 
cortical areas and thereby exhibited a striking overlap of activation. Both oddball types 
showed increased activation in prefrontal cortices including the right anterior IFG and 
bilaterally posterior lateral PFC (i.e. the IFJA), in the left precentral cortex, as well as in the 
posterior frontomedian cortex. Further common regions of significant activation were 
observed in parietal cortices, bilaterally along the IPS, as well as in posterior processing areas, 
specifically in the left posterior inferior temporal gyrus (ITG), left FG, left occipito-temporal 
cortex, and in bilateral extrastriate visual cortices. 
Beyond commonalities, the bidirectionally computed interaction contrast revealed areas that 
were differentially activated by the two oddball conditions. Activations unique to Color-
oddballs were observed in the medial prefrontal cortex, comprising left and right medial SFG 
as well as in the frontomedian cortex in the vicinity of the cingulate sulcus and further in the 
lateral PFC, particularly in the left IFG including Broca’s area. In addition, Color-oddballs 
uniquely elicited activation in the left lingual gyrus, bilateral precuneus, bilateral temporal 
cortices, bilateral thalamus, as well as in the right cerebellum. Areas exhibiting significantly 
more activation for Word-oddballs were less numerous and comprised cortices along the left 
central sulcus and in the left posterior insula, as well as the right anterior insula and posterior 
ITG. The reported activations are listed in Table 2 and depicted in Figure 8 B/C/E. 
Of note, both conflict contrasts exhibited significant activations bilaterally within the inferior 
TPC (BA 38) that, however, did not completely overlap resulting in a double dissociation 
within this region. Temporo-polar activations in the Word-oddball condition peaked in more 
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posterior areas in both hemispheres as compared to the Color-oddball condition which 
exhibited more anterior foci. In the left hemisphere, the activation focus in the Color-oddball 
condition was more dorsally located as compared to the Word-oddball condition. Activations 
of both oddball conditions in the TPC are displayed Figure 9. 
 
Results  54 
Table 1: Comparative listing of regions sensitive to Word-oddball interference and Stroop-
interference. Common and differential activations associated with interference from Word-
oddballs (Word-oddball vs. Oddball control condition / OW-SU) and Stroop-interference 
(Stroop-incongruency vs. Stroop-congruency / RI-CO). Differential activations were revealed 
by interaction contrasts. All activations were determined by random effects analyses on single 
subject contrast images and thresholded at p<0.005, uncorrected. 
Region Statistical effects / t-value (coordinates) 
  Word-oddball Stroop-incongruency Word-oddball > Stroop-incongruency 
Stroop-incongruency > 
Word-oddball 
a) activations unique to Word-oddballs 
R inferior frontal cortex (IFJA) 4.31 (42 6 24) n.s. 3.34 (42 6 27) n.s. 
L inferior frontal cortex (IFJA) 7.20 (–36 12 27) n.s. 7.58 (–33 9 27) n.s. 
R inferior frontal gyrus 3.90 (54 30 15) n.s. 3.77 (54 30 12) n.s. 
R inferior frontal gyrus 3.59 (54 36 3) n.s. 6.45 (54 33 –6) n.s. 
L medial frontal (posterior frontomedian 
cortex) 3.51 (–9 18 45) n.s. 3.50 (–6 36 48) n.s. 
R inferior temporo-polar cortex 3.99 (39 3 –30) n.s. 3.44 (42 0 –33) n.s. 
L inferior temporo-polar cortex 9.01 (–33 3 –39) n.s. 7.78 (–30 3 –39) n.s. 
L fusiform gyrus 4.60 (–42 –66 –15) n.s. 5.08 (–42 –66 –15) n.s. 
R intraparietal sulcus 4.22 (24 –60 51) n.s. 5.17 (24 –60 51) n.s. 
L intraparietal sulcus  3.68 (–21 –57 42) n.s. 4.23 (–30 –48 57) n.s. 
R lateral occipital sulcus 3.78 (33 –72 24) n.s. 3.38 (33 –69 24) n.s. 
L lateral occipital sulcus 4.01 (–36 –75 18) n.s. 3.88 (–27 –66 24) n.s. 
R extrastriate visual cortex 6.35 (36 –90 –6) n.s. 4.59 (36 –93 –9) n.s. 
L extrastriate visual cortex  5.58 (–21 –93 –3) n.s. 6.22 (–27 –87 –9) n.s. 
b) activations unique to Stroop-incongruency 
R posterior frontomedian cortex (pre-
SMA) n.s. 3.91 (15 9 42) n.s. 2.34 (18 6 39) 
R anterior cingulate cortex (subgenual) n.s. 3.09 (3 27 –3) n.s. 3.84 (3 21 3) 
L insula (anterior) n.s. 4.44 (–45 3 0) n.s. 2.47 (–51 –9 –9) 
L precentral gyrus / dorsal premotor 
cortex n.s. 4.09 (–42 –18 66) n.s. 5.33 (– 45 –21 51) 
R basal ganglia / thalamus n.s. 4.97 (24 –21 12) n.s. 3.79 (21 –18 18) 
R cuneus n.s. 3.82 (6 –87 39) n.s. 3.11 (6 –87 42) 
L cuneus n.s. 2.38 (–6 –75 42) n.s. 5.45 (–12 –87 39) 
R inferior cerebellum  n.s. 6.39 (24 –42 –45) n.s. 4.56 (18 –45 –42) 
R superior cerebellum n.s. 2.92 (18 –57 –27) n.s. 4.25 (12 –45 –21) 
R gyrus occipitalis lateralis n.s. 3.54 (36 –63 18) n.s. 2.10 (36 –63 18) 
c) common activations of Word-oddballs and Stroop-incongruency 
R insula (anterior) 4.28 (42 12 9) 6.38 (42 6 3) 3.61 (42 15 9) n.s. 
L insula (posterior) 3.84 (–42 –18 9) 4.49 (–39 –15 6) 3.91 (–39 –3 27) 2.59 (–39 –18 9) 
L precentral sulcus / ventral premotor 
cortex 4.74 (–54 9 33) 3.95 (–60 6 36) 3.42 (–51 9 33) n.s. 
L precentral gyrus / ventral premotor 
cortex 5.57 (–39 –3 27) 3.47 (–51 0 36) 7.58 (–33 9 27) n.s. 
L central sulcus 4.41 (–30 –15 45) 4.22 (–18 –24 57) 4.73 (–42 –9 45) 2.51 (–24 –27 48) 
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Table 2: Comparative listing of regions sensitive to Color-oddball interference and Word-
oddball interference. Common and differential activations associated with interference from 
Color-oddballs (Color-oddball vs. Oddball control condition / OC-SU) and Word-oddballs 
(Word-oddball vs. Oddball control condition / OW-SU). Differential activations were 
revealed by interaction contrasts. All activations were determined by random effects analyses 
on single subject contrast images and thresholded at p<0.005, uncorrected. 
 
Region Statistical effects / t-value (coordinates) 
  Color-oddball Word-oddball Color-oddball > Word-oddball 
Word-oddball > 
Color-oddball 
a) activations unique to Color-oddballs 
R medial frontal cortex (SFG)  6.83 (9 30 60) n.s. 4.73 ( 9 27 54) n.s. 
L medial frontal cortex (SFG) 5.21 (–9 39 48) n.s. 1.86 (–3 39 48) n.s. 
L inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)  11.32 (–57 18 15) n.s. 4.72 (–36 36 18) n.s. 
L inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 5.22 (–42 33 –15) n.s. 4.98 (–36 39 –24) n.s. 
L frontomedian cortex (cingulate sulcus) 6.70 (–12 36 21) n.s. 5.46 (–15 42 9) n.s. 
L head of caudate nucleus 7.00 (–6 0 9) n.s. n.s. n.s. 
L temporo-polar cortex 8.86 (–39 12 –33), n.s. 4.02 (–33 27 –27) n.s. 
R temporo-polar cortex 9.41 (42 12 –33) n.s. 7.07 (54 –9 –30) n.s. 
R parahippocampal gyrus 5.21 (21 –6 –33) n.s. 1.96 (18 –9 –36) n.s. 
L postcentral sulcus 5.02 (–66 –21 24) n.s. 2.38 (–66 –24 24) n.s. 
L middle temporal gyrus 7.33 (–60 –48 0) n.s. 4.42 (–54 –48 –9) n.s. 
R superior temporal sulcus (post. part) 7.53 (57 –45 0) n.s. 4.51 (54 –45 –3) n.s. 
L thalamus 6.66 (–9 –18 3) n.s. 1.95 (–9 –18 –9) n.s. 
R thalamus 3.69 (9 –12 9) n.s. 3.20 (6 –15 18) n.s. 
R precuneus 3.81 (9 –72 48) n.s. 5.48 (9 –63 48) n.s. 
L precuneus 6.85 (–18 –63 36) n.s. 3.46 (–3 –63 48) n.s. 
L lingual gyrus 3.64 (–9 –51 –6) n.s. 4.46 (–18 –51 –6) n.s. 
R cerebellum 8.53 (39 –57 –30) n.s. 3.17 (24 –57 –42) n.s. 
b) activations unique to Word-oddballs 
R insula (anterior) n.s. 4.28 (42 12 9) n.s. 3.10 (39 12 9) 
L temporo-polar cortex n.s. 9.01 (–33 3 –39) n.s. 4.47 (–33 3 –33) 
R temporo-polar cortex n.s. 3.99 (39 3 –30) n.s. 3.71 (42 0 –33) 
L central sulcus n.s. 4.41 (–30 –15 45) n.s. 3.77 (–30 –18 48) 
L insula (posterior) n.s. 3.84 (–42 –18 9) n.s. 2.15 (–45 –18 15) 
R inferior temporal gyrus n.s. 4.23 (54 –42 –24) n.s. 3.12 (48 –36 –27) 
c) common activations of Color-oddballs and Word-oddballs 
R inferior frontal cortex (IFJA)  4.80 (42 6 24) 4.31 (42 6 24) n.s. n.s. 
L inferior frontal cortex (IFJA) 12.25 ( –39 6 21) 7.20 (–36 12 27) n.s. n.s. 
R inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 5.75 (60 21 6) 3.90 (54 30 15) n.s. n.s. 
L precentral gyrus / precentral sulcus 6.61 (–39 3 27) 5.57 (–39 –3 27) n.s. 3.21 (–39 –3 24) 
L/R medial frontal (posterior frontomedian 
cortex) 
4.43 (0 18 48) 3.51 (–9 18 45) n.s. n.s. 
L inferior temporal gyrus (post. part) 8.67 (–51 –54 –15) 4.60 (–42 –66 –15) 4.42 (–54 –48 –9) n.s. 
L fusiform gyrus 6.90 (–36 –75 –18) 4.60 (–42 –66 –15) n.s. n.s. 
R intraparietal sulcus 6.20 (36 –54 45) 4.22 (24 –60 51) n.s. n.s. 
L intraparietal sulcus 6.18 (–30 –69 45) 3.68 (–21 –57 42) 6.72 (–21 –81 39) 2.85 (–18 –57 45) 
L lateral occipital sulcus 5.99 (–39 –69 27) 4.01 (–36 –75 18) 3.79 (–36 –60 30) 1.96 (–27 –63 21) 
R extrastriate visual cortex 5.97 (48 –81 0) 6.35 (36 –90 –6) n.s. n.s. 
L extrastriate visual cortex 5.27 (–30 –84 –9) 5.58 (–21 –93 –3) n.s. n.s. 
R head of caudate nucleus 6.09 (12 –6 –3) 5.03 (15 6 6) n.s. n.s. 






















Figure 8: Neuroimaging data. A-C: Renderings of group-averaged brain activations 
associated with different interference effects. Part A refers to Stroop-interference (contrast: 
RI-CO), part B refers to interference from Word-oddballs (contrast: OW-SU), and part C to 
interference from Color-oddballs (contrast: OC-SU). D-E: Renderings of brain activations 
(composed multi-color brain maps) to compare between the defined interference effects. Part 
D refers to the comparison between Stroop-interference and interference from Word-Oddballs 
(interaction contrast). Common activations are shown in red, activations unique to Word-
oddballs in blue, and activations unique to Stroop-interference in green. Part E refers to the 
comparison between interference from Color-oddballs and interference from Word-Oddballs 
(interaction contrast). Common activations are shown in red, activations unique to Word-
oddballs again in blue, and activations unique to Color-oddballs in green. All activations were 






A-C: activations associated with different interference effects (i.e. 
contrasts). 
A: Stroop-interference (RI-CO) 
B: Word-oddball interference (OW-SU) 
 C: Color-oddball (OC-SU) D-E: composite renderings showing commonalities and differences between single 
interference effects (i.e. contrasts) as revealed by interaction contrasts. 
 D: comparison between Stroop-interference and Word-oddball 
 E: comparison between Color-oddball and Word-oddball 
red: common activations 
blue: activations significantly stronger for Word-oddball 
green: activations significantly stronger for Stroop-incongruency (D) / Color-oddball (E)



















Figure 9: Neuroimaging data. Double dissociation of activations in temporo-polar cortex for 
Color-oddballs (A) and Word-oddballs (B). Color-oddballs exhibited more anterior and 
superior bilateral activation foci as compared to Word-oddballs (see also Table 2). The 
illustration is thresholded at p<0.005, uncorrected, and the view is according to the 
radiological convention (left brain hemisphere on the right side of the illustration, and vice 
versa). 
 
3.2.3 Neural activations related to different conflict factors of Stroop-interference 
 
3.2.3.1 Response-incompatibility vs. semantic incongruency 
Activations related to Stroop-interference as revealed by the contrast RI-CO should be 
separated into two subgroups that represent (the influence of) different conflict factors as two 
distinct and independent neurocognitive subcomponents of Stroop-interference: (a) 
activations related to response-incompatibility and (b) activations related to semantic 
incongruency (see 3.2.1.1), construed to reflect response-conflict and semantic conflict, 
respectively (see 1.2.1). For this purpose, the contrast RI-CO has been conjoined with the 
contrast RI-SI and with the contrast SI-CO, separately, in order to delineate activations related 
to response-incompatibility and semantic incongruency, respectively. Table 3 lists activations 
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of the mentioned contrast conjunctions as well as the corresponding activation foci that have 
been revealed in the single contrasts. There was only one activation focus specifically 
associated with response-incompatibility located in the left precentral gyrus (left ventral 
premotor cortex). This focus was significantly activated for both contrasts RI-SI and RI-CO, 
as well as in the corresponding conjunction. On the other hand, semantic incongruency was 
associated with activation in the posterior frontomedian cortex (pre-SMA), in the left 
postcentral gyrus (left ventral somatosensory cortex), bilateral anterior insula, right 
cerebellum, as well as in the right basal ganglia and thalamus. These brain regions were 
significantly activated for both single contrasts RI-CO and SI-CO, as well as in their 
conjunction. The reported activations are listed in Table 3 and depicted in Figure 10A/B. 
 
 
Table 3: Activations associated with response-incompatibility (section A) and semantic 
incongruency (section B), both revealed by contrast conjunctions (i.e. conjunction analyses). 
Common activations of the contrasts RI-CO and RI-SI were attributed to response-
incompatibility, whereas common activations of RI-CO and SI-CO were ascribed to semantic 
incongruency. All activations were determined by random effects analyses on single subject 




Region Statistical effects / t-value (coordinates) 
  single contrasts contrast conjunctions 
  RI-SI RI-CO SI-CO RI-CO ∩ RI-SI RI-CO ∩ SI-CO
(A) response-incompatibility 
L ventral premotor cortex 5.00 (-60 3 33)*** 3.95 (-60 6 36)** n.s. 3.70 (-60 6 36)*** n.s. 
(B) semantic incongruency 
6.52 (-15 –6 45)*** 2.86 (12 6 42)**  L / R posterior frontomedian cortex 
(pre-SMA) n.s. 3.91 (15 9 42)**  5.27 (-12 6 42)*** 
n.s. 
[2.82 (-12 12 42)*] 
L postcentral gyrus n.s. 3.97 (-45 –21 42)** 7.05 (-51 –21 45)*** n.s. 3.77 (-48 –21 45)***
L insula (anterior) n.s. 4.44 (-45 3 0)** 4.85 (-39 15 6)*** n.s. 3.42 (-42 3 0)** 
R insula (anterior) n.s. 6.38 (42 6 3)*** 3.88 (42 6 3)** n.s. 3.33 (42 6 3)** 
R basal ganglia / thalamus n.s. 4.97 (24 –21 12)*** 9.74 (21 –21 9)*** n.s. 5.13 (24 –21 12)***
R inferior cerebellum  n.s. 6.39 (24 –42 –45)*** 4.46 (30 –66 –21)** n.s. 3.42 (24 –42 –45)**




































(B) SEMANTIC INCONGRUENCY 
 L postcentral / 
somatosensory cortex 
 L insula 
 R insula 
 R posterior frontomedian 
cortex 
 R basal ganglia / thalamus
Figure 10: Activations related to response-incompatibility (revealed by the contrast 
conjunction RI-CO ∩ RI-SI) and related to semantic incongruency (revealed by the contrast 
conjunction RI-CO ∩ SI-CO). Depicted activations were rendered onto cross-sectional 
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3.2.3.1 Task reference 
The neural substrate of task-reference, the third conflict factor of interest, was determined by 
the single contrast CO-SU that includes no other incremental component. Significant 
activations related to task-reference comprised the left rostro-ventral or fronto-opercular 
cortex (BA 47) and adjacent orbitofrontal cortex (OFC, BA 11), the right medial SFG (BA 9), 






Table 4: Activations associated with task-reference revealed by contrast CO-SU. Activations 
were determined by random effects analyses on single subject contrast images, thresholded at 
p≤0.005; uncorrected. 
 
Region Statistical effects / t-value (coordinates) 
  CO-SU 
(C) task-reference 
L fronto-opercular / orbitofrontal cortex  4.59 (–36 33 –12)*** 4.18 (–33 39 0)**  
R medial superior frontal gyrus 7.24 (18 51 42)*** 5.59 (24 39 42)***  



























 R medial superior frontal 
cortex 
 L ventral inferior frontal 
cortex 
 L temporal pole 
TASK REFERENCE 
Figure 11: Activations related to task-reference revealed by the contrast CO-SU. Depicted 
activations were rendered onto cross-sectional (sagittal, coronar, and axial) slices of the 
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4 Discussion 
 
4.1 Dissociating motor and attentional components of cognitive interference 
On the one hand, the current oddball activations (i.e. activations related to color oddballs and 
word oddballs) nicely match those that were found in the reported prior investigation of 
Gruber and collaborators (e.g. Gruber & Goschke, 2004; Melcher et al., 2004; see 1.3.4). In 
essence, the current data exhibited oddball activation in the same frontoparietal network 
comprising the lateral prefrontal cortex including the IFJA, the posterior frontomedian cortex, 
intraparietal regions and extrastriate visual cortices. On the other hand, however, the current 
data’s activations related to Stroop-interference did not match the findings of Zysset and 
colleagues (Zysset et al., 2000; see 1.3.4), who observed a frontoparietal activation pattern 
related to Stroop-interference that broadly corresponded to the oddball pattern described 
above. Therefore, the current data does not corroborate the initial observation of a common 
activation pattern for Stroop-interference and oddball interference. Rather, Stroop-
interference and Word-oddballs elicited quite distinct patterns of neural activation that 
exhibited only sparse overlap.  
In conclusion, the comparison between Stroop-interference and oddball interference did not 
define one single or core neural mechanism of cognitive control as was initially expected, but 
rather dissociated two functionally distinct and complementary control mechanisms. In other 
words, the reported findings suggest that the two contrasts focusing on Stroop-interference 
and interference from Word-oddballs in the present study do not converge in a common or 
core neural mechanisms of cognitive control but rather map two different subcomponents (or 
levels) of cognitive interference, (A) a motor component and (B) an attentional component, 
that refer to distinct control functions (i.e. neural mechanisms). In the following two 
subsections, the delineated subcomponents will be presented and explained in more detail. 
 
4.1.1 A motor component of interference 
Stroop-incongruent (SI) trials and Stroop-congruent (CO) trials used exactly the same words 
(BIG and SMALL), that only differed in the particular color-size combination. Hence, word 
meaning (i.e. the lexical dimension) in both conditions is equally associated with the current 
task-set and can be expected to be equally able to distract attention from the currently relevant 
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size dimension. In accordance with this assertion, Milham and Banich (2005) found enhanced 
activity in a posterior division of the ACC in relation to both incongruent and congruent 
Stroop trials. Based on this and prior findings (Milham et al., 2002; Milham et al., 2003b; 
Milham & Banich, 2005; see 1.2.2), they argued that attentional demands may be similarly 
increased on both incongruent and congruent trials due to competition between task-relevant 
and task-irrelevant information (for priority in processing), as task-irrelevant information in 
both conditions is semantically related to the current task-set, i.e. provides competing task-
related information (see also below, 4.1.2 and 4.4.2). On the other hand, words (i.e. word 
meanings) of RI trials introduce incompatible information at the response-level whereas 
words of CO trials do not. Taken together, the contrast RI-CO reasonably subtracts out – at 
least to some extent – the attentional component of interference (i.e. equates for interference 
at the attentional level) and focuses on interference occurring at the level of motor or response 
preparation (i.e. response conflict). This conclusion is strongly supported by the activations 
revealed by this contrast which comprised dorsal and ventral premotor cortices, the pre-SMA, 
the cerebellum, as well as the basal ganglia and thalamus, regions that are well known to be 
implicated in the preparation and control of motor responses (e.g. Ikeda, 1992; Wiese et al., 
2004; Monchi et al., 2006). Generally, response conflict can be expected to recruit additional 
motor control in terms of strengthened response selection or inhibition. Specifically the dorsal 
premotor cortex, a prominent activation focus of the Stroop-interference contrast (RI-CO), has 
been described to play an important role in the mapping of sensory signals onto motor 
responses (Wise et al., 1996), and there is convincing evidence that this region is strongly 
involved in inhibitory motor control, i.e. controlled response selection (Praamstra et al., 
1999). Similarly, an influential hypothesis – primarily derived from electrophysiological 
studies – assumes that the basal ganglia essentially contribute to motor control by inhibiting 
incompatible motor tendencies that (might) interfere with an actually intended motor action 
(Mink, 1996; Aron et al., 2003). Moreover, several studies implicated the thalamus conjointly 
with the basal ganglia in motor control, i.e. in the implementation or inhibition of motor 
responses, during conflict situations (e.g. Huettel, 2001; Monchi et al., 2001; Aron et al., 
2003). Given the reported findings, it is persuasive – if not highly probable – that the 
activation pattern related to Stroop-interference primarily reflects strengthened motor control 
triggered by response conflict (i.e. the co-activation of two incompatible response tendencies) 
which should prevent false responding. 
Moreover, there was significant activation in the left ventral somatosensory cortex related to 
Stroop-interference which appeared to be significantly stronger than in the Word-oddball 
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contrast. Activation in this region has been repeatedly related to the processing of tactile 
sensations of the contralateral fingertip (e.g. Burton et al., 1999; Pleger et al., 2006) and 
beyond that has been shown to be boosted by increased attention towards proprioception, 
even in absence of proper stimulation (Burton et al., 1999). Furthermore, as revealed by 
morphological investigations of the animal brain (Porter, 1991, Porter, 1997), the 
somatosensory cortex projects to primary motor areas and in this way may essentially 
contribute to motor preparation (see Pleger et al., 2006). In conclusion, the observed 
somatosensory activation assumably underlie enhanced proprioceptive/tactile attention to the 
responding fingers as further aspect of strengthened motor control efforts. 
As already pointed out, the contrast RI-CO may intermingle interference at the semantic level 
and the motor level as the word’s lexical meaning on RI trials is both semantic incongruent 
and response-incompatible (see 1.4.2.3). In the current work, these properties of task-
irrelevant word information were defined as conflict factors (see 1.2.1), and one major 
purpose of the current work was to further split activations of the contrast RI-CO in two 
subgroups, (a) activations related to response-incompatibility (reflecting motor conflict) and 
(b) activations related to semantic incongruency (reflecting semantic conflict). The 
corresponding results are discussed in one of the following subsections (see 4.4.1). 
 
4.1.2 An attentional component of interference 
According to the conceptualization of oddball interference in this work (see 1.2.3.3), the task-
irrelevant word dimension in the Word-oddball condition gains saliency through the relative 
rareness of occurrence of the presented words and consequently evokes an attentional 
orienting response (i.e. an involuntary attentional switch) which subjects have to override. 
Thereby, as words’ lexical meaning on Word-oddball trials is response-ineligible, response 
preparation in this condition should be widely unaffected. Consequently, interference 
emanating from Word-oddballs – which is also true for Color-oddballs – assumably occurs at 
an earlier processing stage, solely at the attentional level and not at the response or motor 
level. In line with this notion, Word-oddballs – which is again also true for Color-oddballs – 
exhibited significant activation in a frontoparietal network which in the neuroimaging 
literature has been consistently related to conditions of enhanced attentional demands during 
cognitive tasks and, beyond this, has been interpreted as to reflect the exertion of top-down 
attentional control, particularly the implementation of selective attention (e.g. Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002, Fan et al., 2003; see 1.3.2). Regarding the current investigation, frontoparietal 
 
Discussion  65 
activation arguably underlay the overriding of the orienting response to the oddball events 
(i.e. to the oddball dimension) which has disrupted the task-appropriate attentional set. Within 
the frontoparietal network, both oddball conditions exhibited the IFJA as one main site of 
activation which, in accordance with the prior expectations of this work (see 1.4.2), suggests 
that this cortical region plays a pivotal role in attentional control during competition (see also 
below; 4.3). 
As mentioned above, the current data did not replicate the frontoparietal activation pattern 
associated with Stroop-interference as it was observed in the Zysset study (Zysset et al., 
2000). Rather, Stroop-interference in the current work exhibited primarily activation in 
premotor and motor regions, that can be convincingly interpreted as reflecting the 
implementation of strengthened motor control (see above). There are obvious differences 
between the two studies that may account for the divergence of findings. First, Zysset and 
colleagues employed another variant of the Stroop paradigm, the “Color-Word Matching 
Stroop Task”. Here, on each trial subjects are presented with two words simultaneously while 
they have to match the color of the first (above-standing) to the meaning of the second 
(below-standing). In this task version, interference takes place at a pure conceptual level and 
is (chronologically) separated from response preparation which – beyond that – is kept 
balanced across the experimental conditions (see 1.3.4). Second, to define Stroop-
interference, Zysset contrasted incongruent trials against neutral trials, while the present study 
contrasted incongruent trials against congruent trials, a contrast that arguably equalizes for 
attentional components of competition processing (see above; 4.1.1). On the other hand, the 
contrast incongruent against neutral trials in the Zysset study comprises substantial attentional 
components because the used baseline neutral trials (consisting of a row of colored Xs) 
include no word meaning to attentionally interfere with the attended color. In contrast, lexical 
word meanings of congruent trials are exactly the same as those of incongruent trials, which 
should therefore be equally able to draw attention (see above; 4.1.1). Accordingly, Milham 
and Banich considered the employment of a broader definition of cognitive conflict that is not 
restricted to cases of incongruity (see Milham & Banich, 2005). Basically, conflict may be 
conceptualized as any situation in which there are two or more competing sources of 
response-eligible information or, alternatively, as situations in which task-irrelevant 
information is related to task-demands (i.e. to the task set). In this context, task reference and 
response mapping (i.e. response eligibility), as properties of word meaning in both 
incongruent and congruent Stroop trials, might be conceived as conflict factors through which 
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task-irrelevant information gains saliency and thus may induce attentional interference, i.e. 
competition (see 1.4.2.3). 
Zysset and colleagues reported strong activation in the posterior lateral PFC belonging to the 
IFJA related to Stroop-interference whereas the contrast RI-CO in the current work did not 
exhibit activation in this cortical structure. As activation in the IFJA was essentially expected 
to occur when top-down control is required for (re-)orienting attention to task-relevant 
information (see 1.4.2), the lack of IFJA activation particularly corroborates the assumption 
that the contrast RI-CO equalizes – at least partly – for attentional processing. Furthermore, 
Stroop-interference as defined by the contrast RI-SU did exhibit IFJA activation which also 
fits in the outlined interpretation in so far as SU trials – as already evident from their label – 
are semantically unrelated to the task. Therefore, the contrast RI-SU conclusively involves 
substantial attentional processing. The functional role of the IFJA in the present work (in 
particular) and in cognitive control (in general) will be further discussed in a following 
subsection (see 4.3). 
 
4.2 Oddball activations and their sensitivity to processing domain 
The two oddball conditions exhibited a broad overlap of neural activation, mainly in anterior 
regions comprising both frontolateral and frontomedian cortices, but also in parietal cortices 
and other posterior processing areas. Thereby, Color-oddballs exhibited the more extensive 
activation pattern relative to Word-oddballs and also additional unique activations, e.g. in the 
left inferior frontolateral cortex, the medial superior frontal gyrus, the precuneus, and the left 
lingual gyrus. Activation in the left lingual gyrus has been previously implicated in processing 
of color (e.g. Corbetta et al., 1991; Zeki & Marini, 1998) and therefore in the present context 
substantiates the statement that the oddball color did draw special attention (i.e. did evoke an 
orienting response). Other unique activations of Color-oddballs may alternatively reflect 
quantitative differences, i.e. differences related to the degree of evoked interference, rather 
than qualitative differences between the two oddball conditions. Interestingly enough, the data 
revealed a double dissociation within the left and right TPC between the two oddball 
conditions. The TPC has been repeatedly implicated in conscious perception as well as 
semantic encoding and decoding of objects or object features (Markowitsch, 1995; Mesulam, 
1998; Sewards & Sewards, 2002; Damasio et al., 2004). The observed double dissociation 
putatively reflects the deviation detection in (i.e. orienting response to) different visual 
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attributes, i.e. the respective dimension – color or lexical word meaning – in which the 
oddball event has occurred.  
The strong activation overlap that was found in prefrontal areas is in line with the assumption 
that an anterior prefrontal system dynamically modulates activation in posterior processing 
areas in order to select task-relevant over task-irrelevant information (e.g. Banich et al., 2000; 
LaBerge, 2005; see 1.3.1). The posterior lateral PFC or IFJA – that represents a main 
activation focus in both oddball contrasts – is a candidate region to exert this attentional 
control function (see below). In this context, the interesting question arose as to whether 
attentional selection works through boosting the processing of task-relevant information 
and/or through inhibition the processing of task-irrelevant information (e.g. Banich et al., 
2000; Egner & Hirsch, 2005). In the present study, the two oddball conditions showed – with 
few exceptions – a broad overlap of activation in posterior processing areas while they shared 
the same task-relevant information (size) and differed in the distracting task-irrelevant 
attribute dimension (word vs. color). This finding is compatible with the notion that boosting 
the processing of task-relevant information plays an especially important role in attentional 
selection and particularly in the processing (i.e. resolution) of cognitive interference (e.g. 
Wojciulik et al., 1998; Egner & Hirsch, 2005). Banich et al. (2000) also investigated the 
influence of the processing domain of task-irrelevant information during interference (i.e. 
conflict) processing by comparing two different versions of the Stroop task which differed in 
the task-irrelevant information of the presented stimuli but not in the dimension which had to 
be attended. While Banich and colleagues likewise found highly overlapping activations 
within the frontolateral cortex, in contrast to our data, they also reported a strong influence of 
task-irrelevant information on posterior processing regions, suggesting that attentional 
selection also involves modulating the processing of task-irrelevant information. However, 
task-irrelevant information in the Banich study was semantically related to the task-relevant 
information, which is not true for the oddball conditions in the present study and which may 
account for its strong influence on posterior activations. As pointed out by Banich and 
colleagues themselves, selection of task-relevant information by prefrontal regions may 
involve “alerting” all posterior brain regions that process information related to the current 
task set, even if this information is presented in the irrelevant dimension. Generally, when 
individuals direct their attention to one particular attribute of an item, increased activity is 
observed in the posterior brain region specialized for processing this visual attribute (e.g. 
human equivalent of MT or V5; O’Craven et al., 1997; Kastner et al., 1998; Martinez et al., 
1999). 
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Color-oddballs compared to Word-oddballs elicited more extensive neural activations as well 
as a stronger effect in the RT data. Thus, both the behavioral and neuroimaging data indicated 
stronger interference emanating from Color-oddballs as compared to Word-oddballs which 
can be explained twofold: (a) Color also occurred as task-relevant attribute during the 
experimental course within the color-task, whereas word-meaning did not (see 2.1.2.2). As 
color had been previously attended to as task-relevant information, it hence may have been 
better able to attract attentional resources even as task-irrelevant attribute. (b) Independent of 
the task context, color is inherently a quite salient and conspicuous attribute dimension that 
apparently can be cognitively represented in a rather direct manner. Word-meaning, in 
contrast, appears to be much less salient and requires mediating semantic decoding processes 
to be cognitively represented. Therefore, task-irrelevant deviances in color may be generally 
more outstanding and influential compared to task-irrelevant deviances in word meaning. 
 
4.3 Neural activations to impose an attentional set 
There was strong activation related to both Color- and Word-oddballs in posterior parts of the 
lateral PFC, belonging to the inferior frontal junction area (IFJA). As was emphasized in the 
introduction of the present work, there is a growing body of evidence suggesting an important 
role of this cortical region in task-set management as well as in the selection of task-relevant 
over task-irrelevant information (see 1.3.5). For instance, the IFJA has been related to task-set 
preparation (Brass and von Cramon, 2004; Gruber et al., 2006), cognitive set shifting (e.g. 
Konishi et al., 1998; Konishi et al., 1999; Dove et al., 2000; Derrfuss et al., 2005), response 
inhibition (Konishi et al., 1999; Konishi et al., 2003), as well as to the processing of Stroop-
incongruency (e.g. Leung et al., 2000; Zysset et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2003a, Derrfuss et 
al., 2005), and task-irrelevant oddball events (e.g. Milham et al., 2003a; Gruber & Goschke, 
2004; Melcher et al., 2003). In a study similar to the present work, Milham and colleagues 
(Milham et al., 2003a; see also 1.3.5) sought to investigate prefrontal involvement in top-
down attentional control, and thereby they wanted to elucidate whether Stroop interference 
and word oddball interference produce similar or distinct neural activation. As one main 
result, word oddball trials and Stroop-incongruent trials produced marked activation overlap 
in a posterior region of the PFC which belongs to the IFJA. Based on this and prior findings, 
Milham and colleagues concluded that the posterior inferior PFC is substantially involved in 
manipulating posterior regions to ensure selection of task-relevant information. In contrast to 
Milham’s results, the current data exhibited no IFJA activation in relation to Stroop-
interference as represented by the contrast RI-CO. Rather, the current data exhibited IFJA 
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activation only in relation to Color- and Word-oddballs, that nevertheless can be assumed to 
underlie the same cognitive control function as the IFJA activation in the Milham study. The 
reported discrepancy of findings can be plausibly attributed to differences between the 
contrasts that have been computed to define effects of Stroop-interference in the current 
investigation and in the Milham study. While in the analyses of the current work response-
eligible incongruent trials were contrasted against congruent trials (RI-CO) – a contrast which 
arguably equalizes at least partly for attentional processing (see 4.1.1) – Milham and 
colleagues contrasted response-eligible incongruent trials against response-ineligible 
incongruent trials. Response-ineligible incongruent color words, in contrast to congruent color 
words, are not part of the task-set (i.e. response-set) and therefore might be expected to be less 
salient (i.e. attention-capturing) as compared to both incongruent-eligible and congruent trials. 
Hence, the contrast “incongruent-eligible vs. incongruent-ineligible” in the Milham study 
arguably not only includes motor but also substantial attentional components of interference 
processing. 
Note: In a previous subsection of the discussion (see 4.1.1), the discrepancy of neuroimaging 
findings, regarding the involvement of the IFJA in Stroop-interference, between the current 
work and a Stroop study of Zysset and collaborators (Zysset et al., 2000) was explained in a 
very similar and compatible way. 
In the current work, the contrast RI-SU was additionally computed in order to derive effects 
of Stroop-interference from the same baseline as the oddball effects. In this contrast, Stroop-
interference did exhibit a significant activation in the IFJA. This finding corroborates the 
above explanation for differences regarding the IFJA involvement in the present work and the 
Milham study. As word meaning on SU trials is not semantically related to the task at hand 
(i.e. is not part of the task-set), the contrast can be expected to map not only motor but also 
attentional components of interference. 
Taken together, in accordance with findings of prior investigations (e.g. Banich et al., 2000; 
Zysset et al., 2000; Milham et al., 2003a; Brass & von Cramon, 2004), the current data 
emphasize a prominent role of the posterior inferior frontolateral cortex, i.e. the IFJA, in 
attentional control. Particularly, the IFJA may provide a top-down executive mechanism for 
imposing an attentional set for task-relevant information by modulating processing in 
posterior neuronal perceptual systems. 
This putative role of the IFJA is also in line with the widespread general assumption of a 
basically twofold functional and neural organization of cognitive control comprising a 
monitoring or evaluative instance represented by frontomedian cortices and an executive or 
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regulative instance represented by frontolateral cortices. Specifically, the conflict monitoring 
theory (see 1.3.3) postulates that the anterior cingulate cortex (AAC) monitors for and 
responds to the occurrence of conflict in information processing and thereby signals the 
frontolateral cortex to strengthen control efforts in a context-sensitive manner (e.g. Carter et 
al., 1998; MacDonald et al., 2000; Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004). However, 
neuroimaging studies providing evidence for the conflict monitoring theory most consistently 
pointed to the more anteriorly located mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (mid-DLPFC) rather 
than the IFJA as the crucial frontolateral area in cognitive control (Petrides, 2000; see 1.3.3). 
In contrast, the current data – in line with a recent series of brain imaging studies – indicate 
that the IFJA represents the primary frontolateral region in the exertion of top-down 
attentional control (see 1.3.5; for a review see Brass et al., 2005). Taken together, findings 
may give rise to the speculation that the primary role attributed to mid-DLPFC in the context 
of cognitive control and frontolateral cortex function is owed to the fact that consistent 
activation in the IFJA has been neglected (see Brass et al., 2005). 
 
4.4 Conflict factors during Stroop task performance 
One major issue of the current work was to trace back Stroop-interference to the influence of 
circumscribed properties of task-irrelevant word information that can be conceived as conflict 
factors (see 1.2.1), and thereby to determine the properties’ (i.e. the conflict factors’) neural 
effects. In particular, it was sought to delineate the neural substrates of three conflict factors: 
(A) response-incompatibility (i.e. word identity indicates an opposed response), (B) semantic 
incongruency (i.e. word identity is incongruent, independent of its response-eligibility), and 
(C) task-reference (i.e. word identity is semantically related to the task-set, independent of its 
semantic concordance with the relevant dimension) (see 1.4.2.3). 
Specifically, it was planned to split activations of the contrast RI-CO – that have been already 
presented and discussed in prior subsections (see 3.2.1.1 and 4.1) – in two subgroups referring 
to response-incompatibility and semantic incongruency that reflect motor conflict and 
semantic conflict, respectively. For this purpose, conflict factors were assigned to common 
activations of contrast pairings (i.e. to contrast conjunctions) comprising the contrast RI-CO 
on the one hand and one further contrast – RI-SI for response-incompatibility and SI-CO for 
semantic incongruency – on the other hand (see 2.2.1.3.3). Furthermore, it was planned to 
determine the influence of task-reference of task-irrelevant word meaning – i.e. being a 
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(response-eligible) size word – as third conflict factor that is inherent in both incongruent and 
congruent trials, and that might essentially contribute to the overall Stroop interference effect. 
 
4.4.1 Splitting intermingled effects of response-incompatibility and semantic 
incongruency 
 
4.4.1.1 Behavioral effects of response-incompatibility and semantic incongruency 
The behavioral data showed that only response-incompatibility (as implemented in RI trials) 
but not semantic incongruency (as implemented in SI trials) led to significantly increased 
RTs, i.e. produced a behavioral effect. Although SI trials exhibited descriptively longer RTs 
compared to both CO and SU trials, the corresponding behavioral effects did not reach the 
level of statistical significance. In contrast, van Veen and Carter (van Veen & Carter, 2005) 
observed significantly prolonged RTs for both eligible-incongruent (widely corresponding to 
RI) and ineligible-incongruent (widely corresponding to SI) trials (compared to congruent 
trials), indicating a behavioral effect of both response-incompatibility (i.e. response conflict) 
and semantic incongruency (i.e. semantic conflict). However, the study of van Veen and 
Carter used another Stroop paradigm that was introduced by De Houwer (2003) which may 
account for the divergent findings. The outstanding feature of this paradigm is that it contains 
four response-eligible color values (and none response-ineligible value), two for each 
response side (i.e. response category). Therefore, in De Houwer’s paradigm, on each trial type 
– RI, SI, and CO trials – the distracting word information is part of the response-set. This 
feature was explicitly implemented to create a Stroop paradigm that experimentally controls 
for response eligibility (response mapping). In contrast to De Houwer’s paradigm, the word 
meaning of the SI condition in the current work is response-ineligible which might explain 
that the behavioral effect of this condition did not reach the statistical threshold. Moreover, 
and also in contrast to the current work, van Veen & Carter used color rather than size as 
relevant dimension, while a semantically incongruent color word might be more influential as 
the semantically incongruent size-related word ‘BROAD’. 
 
4.4.1.1 Neural effects of response-incompatibility and semantic incongruency 
The conjunction analyses revealed only one activation focus specific to response-
incompatibility which was located in the left precentral gyrus. This region belongs to the 
ventral premotor cortex (BA 6). Generally, as already evident from its name, the premotor 
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cortex is well known to play a pivotal role in the planning or preparation of motor responses, 
i.e. limb movements (e.g. Ikeda, 1992; Wiese et al., 2004). Specifically, a number of 
neuroimaging studies related activation in the ventral premotor cortex (i.e. inferior precentral 
gyrus) to the imagination, selection, and execution of contralateral finger movements (e.g. 
Cunnington et al., 2006), suggesting that the activated area is part of (or correponds to) the 
finger or hand representation of the premotor cortex. Therefore, in the current data, this 
activation focus conceivably reflects incremental or competing (button-press) response 
tendencies (in terms of response conflict) induced by response-incomptible word emaning. In 
line with this assertion, several other studies that used button-presses as response categories 
observed activation in the ventral premotor cortex under conditions of response competition, 
e.g. in the flanker task (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001) and in the Stroop task (Leung et al., 
2000; Mead et al., 2002). The attribution of this activation focus specifically to response-
incompatibility (rather than semantic incongruency) in the current work further corroborates 
this interpretation.  
Other activations of the contrast RI-CO appeared as common activation with the contrast SI-
CO and therefore were attributed (i.e. assigned) to semantic incongruency. These activations 
mainly comprised the posterior frontomedian cortex (pre-SMA), the left postcentral (i.e. 
somatosensory) cortex, the cerebellum, as well as the basal ganglia and thalamus. In a 
previous subsection, these activation foci have been already discussed as reflecting 
strengthened motor control efforts to prevent false responding, i.e. to ensure task-appropriate 
performance (see 4.1.1). For instance, the observed somatosensory activation was discussed 
as conceivable neural substrate of enhanced “proprioceptive attention” to the responding 
fingers as one aspect of strengthened motor control. Semantic incongruency further appeared 
related to activation in the bilateral anterior insula. For a long time, the insula has been 
primarily or even exclusively related to non-cognitive functions (e.g. visceral, sensational 
functions) as well as to language comprehension and production (Augustine, 1985/1996). 
However, recent studies seem to implicate the insula in top-down attentional processing. For 
instance, insular activity has been reported related to cognitive interference (Egner & Hirsch, 
2005; Leung et al., 2000), inhibitory filtering of invalid information (Thomsen et al., 2005), 
and selective stimulus processing (Hopfinger et al, 2000). The reported findings may lead one 
to conjecture that activity in the insula generally contributes to cognitive control to minimize 
or resolve interference. Alternatively, insular activation during cognitive interference may 
underlie an altered body sensation – e.g. enhanced tenseness – realted to the agent’s efforts to 
meet the increased situational requirements. 
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Taken together, the activation pattern related to semantic incongruency conceivably underlies 
strengthened control efforts, particularly selective motor processing in terms of reinforcing or 
shielding the correct and/or inhibiting the incorrect response (see above; 4.1.1). Hence, the 
current findings suggest that the neural executive system recruits strengthened motor control 
already in case of semantic conflict without the occurrence of proper response competition. 
As semantic conflict generally does not implicate an enhanced error probability (e.g. van 
Veen & Carter, 2005), strengthened motor control in response to pure semantic incongruency 
on SI trials may appear somewhat unnecessary. However, as the cognitive system also 
encountered response conflict and perhaps detected erroneous responses on previous RI trials 
that also included semantically incongruent word meaning (i.e. also included semantic 
incongruency as conflict factor), it may recruit control mechanisms in a preventive (rather 
than remedial) manner on both RI and SI trials. Hence, the current data provide no evidence 
for the existence of different control mechanisms for the processing (i.e. the resolution) of 
response conflict and semantic conflict which has been proposed by van Veen and Carter in 
the above-mentioned fMRI Stroop study (see van Veen & Carter, 2005). Essentially, this 
study showed a double dissociation of activation in ACC and DLPFC for the comparison 
between response conflict and semantic conflict. Based on this finding, the authors proposed 
that the neural control system possesses two distinct and parallel attentional networks in 
conflict processing that are specific to the level of cognitive processing – either the semantic 
or the motor level – at which conflict occurs. In contrast to this notion, the present 
investigation’s findings suggest that conflict processing recruit the same attentional 
mechanisms regardless of whether conflict occurs solely at the semantic level or additionally 
at the motor level. 
 
4.4.2 Competition and residual semantic processing due to task-reference 
All three conditions RI, SI, and CO trials included lexical word meaning that was 
semantically related to the task-set, i.e. provided competing size-information. It has been 
proposed that task-related irrelevant information may generally cause competition in 
information processing (see Milham et al., 2002; Milham & Banich, 2005). Accordingly, 
several authors have suggested that congruent Stroop-trials may have increased attentional 
requirements relative to neutral (i.e. semantically unrelated) Stroop-trials (Carter et al., 1995; 
Posner & Girolamo, 1998; Milham et al., 2002; Milham & Banich, 2005; see 4.1.1). In the 
current work, to define the neural substrate of task relatedness or task-reference – the third 
conflict factor of interest – the contrast CO-SU was computed. This contrast revealed 
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circumscribed activation in rostro-ventral regions of the left inferior frontal cortex (BA 47 / 
BA 11), the right medial superior frontal cortex (BA 9), and in the left temporal pole (BA 38). 
There is a body of empirical evidence for each of these cortical areas to implicate them in 
semantic processing of linguistic tokens. Therefore, the current data’s activations in these 
areas may be conclusively interpreted as reflecting residual semantic processing of task-
irrelevant lexical word meaning when this is related to the task-set. In particular, results of 
imaging studies using both PET and fMRI strongly suggest that activation in the left inferior 
prefrontal cortex is directly related to stimulus-driven semantic processing. Specifically, 
anterior inferior frontal regions in the left hemisphere have been repeatedly shown to exhibit 
stronger activity in semantic than in non-semantic word-level processing and thus may 
substantially contribute to semantic elaboration (Petersen et al., 1988; Poldrack et al., 1999; 
Noppeney & Price, 2002). Likewise, neuroimaging studies converge to suggest that the left 
TPC plays a particularly important role in meaning or concept identification of lexical 
information. For instance, the left-hemispherical temporal pole has been implicated in word 
recollection and word comparison (e.g. Damasio et al., 1996, Vandenberghe et al., 1996), 
semantic priming (e.g. Kutas & Hillyard, 1984, Mummery et al., 1999), as well as meaning 
composition during sentence reading (e.g. Stowe et al., 1998), and focal lesions in this region 
have been associated with semantic deficits (for review, see Saffran & Sholl, 1999). Finally, 
there are studies that reported activation in dorsal frontomedian cortex which included 
linguistic tasks that require meaning-based inductive reasoning (Goel et al., 1997), semantic 
coherence judgments (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2001) and semantic categorizations (Binder et 
al., 1997).  
Against an interpretation of the superior frontal activation as reflecting semantico-linguistic 
processing, one may object that this activation focus is localized in the right hemisphere. 
Generally, there is a strong dominance of the left hemisphere for the majority of language 
functions, and the right hemisphere normally does not appear to have much responsibility for 
basic cognitive-linguistic processes (Capozzoli, 1999; Gernsbacher & Kaschak, 2003). 
However, higher-order linguistic processes like meta-semantic interpretations or inferences 
(e.g. understanding metaphors, indirect requests, and humor) have been related to bilateral 
activations equally involving the right hemisphere, including prefrontal regions (e.g. Bottini et 
al., 1994; Mitchell & Crow, 2005). Furthermore, it has been proposed that the right 
hemisphere gets specifically involved in lexical processing when subordinate associations 
rather than basic semantic connotations of a given word form become relevant (Coney & 
Evans, 2000). Hence, the right-hemispherical location of the superior frontal activation does 
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not contradict the interpretation of semantic-linguistic processing but rather converges with 
prior studies findings. 
Taken together, incremental (i.e. increased) semantic processing of task-irrelevant 
information may provide a meaningful and plausible concretization of ‘competition’ between 
task-relevant and task-irrelevant information during Stroop-performance which has been 
expected to occur during both incongruent and congruent trials (see Milham et al., 2002; 
Milham & Banich, 2005). 
 
4.5 Outlook – Future Directions 
The present data revealed definitive and meaningful results regarding the current work’s 
questions and purposes. Hence, findings may significantly contribute to refine and broaden 
the understanding of neural mechanisms that underlie cognitive control during cognitive 
interference. Beyond the current work’s objectives, results raise interesting new questions and 
thus may provide a fruitful basis or starting point for related successional investigations. In 
this last subsection, different issues for potential future projects to build up on the present 
work’s findings will be stated. 
 
4.5.1 Replicating current findings within the ’traditional’ color word Stroop task 
It would be a particularly interesting issue to replicate findings of the present study with a 
more “traditional” version of the Stroop task that uses ink color instead of font size as relevant 
target attribute. In the current work, font size was chosen as target dimension because this 
allowed to implement a color oddball condition that consisted of a task-irrelevant rarely 
occurring and response-ineligible color value. To create a suchlike color oddball condition – 
which was one main issue of the present work – would not have been feasible within a 
traditional color Stroop task where color already serves as target dimension (see 2.1.3.2). 
Specifically, a related study that uses a color Stroop paradigm could elucidate whether the two 
distinct components of cognitive interference that have been delineated in the present work – 
a motor component and an attentional component (see 4.1) – can be replicated across different 
paradigm versions. Similarly, one may repeat the factorial decomposition analyses – 
conducted in the present work to define the neural substrates of the defined conflict factors 
(response-incompatibility, semantic incongruency, and task-reference; see 4.4) – on 
neuroimaging data that have been acquired during subject’s performance of a color Stroop 
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task version. The underlying question here would be whether the defined conflict factors 
exhibit comparable neural substrates across different task versions of the Stroop paradigm. In 
both outlined cases, replications of findings would confirm the present conclusions and 
interpretations concerning the existence of different neurocognitive (sub-)components of 
interference resolution and their respective characters. On the other hand, functional 
neuroanatomical dissociations could also be instructive as these might give relevant insights 
in the task- or context-dependency of the delineated neurocognitive mechanisms. 
 
4.5.2 Investigation of the influence of transient emotional states on cognitive 
control processes 
The existence of a close interaction between cognitive processes and emotional sates is 
intuitively evident, as it is commonly manifest in everyday human experience and behavior. 
Thereby, emotional states can attenuate cognitive activity, and vice versa, in terms of a 
reciprocal suppression (e.g. Drevets & Raichle, 1998). Prior neuroimaging studies support the 
view that an interplay between emotion and cognition is reflected in discernable changes in 
the brain’s functional anatomy (e.g. Lane et al., 1998; Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). However, 
further tests to substantiate this hypothesis are needed. Thereby, the behavioral and neural 
instantiation of the influence of experimentally induced – either negative or positive – 
emotional states on Stroop-task performance would be an especially relevant issue, as the 
Stroop paradigm is among the most widely used and cited experimental tasks to investigate 
cognitive control mechanisms. In particular, future studies may be set out to examine the 
susceptibility of the neurocognitive mechanisms of interference processing – particularly 
those that were defined in the current work – to the agent’s current emotional state. As a 
concrete procedure, one may apply standardized picture materials – for instance, the IAPS 
(International Affective Picture System; Lang, et al., 1988/1995/2005) – to look at the 
influence of emotion on cognition on a trial-by-trial basis. Such a study design would allow to 
systematically expand the analyses of the current work by additionally including “emotional 
state” (in terms of a pre-induced transient emotional arousal state) as factor or moderator 
variable in the statistical model and thereby to elucidate its influence on the created condition 
contrasts and contrast conjunctions, i.e. on the respective neurocognitive mechanisms and 
components. 
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4.5.3 Functional specialization and functional integration of circumscribed brain 
areas 
The present findings provide interesting insights into the ‘functional specialization’ of 
circumscribed brain areas in the context of cognitive or attentional control. For instance, the 
present findings support the assumption that the inferior frontal junction area (IFJA) 
essentially contributes to top-down attentional control during competition by biasing 
activation in posterior sensory systems (see 4.3). Moreover, activation in the left temporo-
polar cortex was conclusively interpreted as reflecting residual semantic processing of 
distracting, task-irrelevant information when this is related to the current task-set (see 4.4.2), 
and the ventral somatosensory (i.e. postcentral) cortex was convincingly implicated in motor 
control or motor attention in the case of cognitive conflict (see 4.4.1). The present findings 
and their interpretations may motivate future studies that seek to further elucidate the 
functional specialization of certain of the highlighted cortical areas in cognitive control. 
Generally, the term ‘functional specialization’ denotes regionally specific effects – i.e. 
physiological variations in a circumscribed neuroanatomical area – that can be attributed to 
changes in stimuli or task-conditions and thus can be (indirectly) related to cognitive factors 
or processes (Friston, 1998). However, this approach might not be sufficient for an adequate 
description of the neural implementation of neurocognitive mechanisms or functions, as it 
completely neglects interactions among the actually focused and other distant brain areas. In 
other words, cognitive control may not be meaningfully conceptualized as activity of single, 
isolated neuroanatomical units but rather as emanating from multiple interacting cortical and 
subcortical areas that together constitute functionally specialized neural networks. 
Accordingly, it would be an important and highly relevant issue to investigate the functional 
connectivity of areas that exhibited prominent activation in the current data. There exists a 
number of statistical approaches that allow to address functional integration or interactions 
between different brain areas by looking for correlations among activity in different brain 
areas, i.e. by trying to explain activity in one brain area in relation to others (e.g. Friston et al., 
1993; McIntosh et al., 1994). These analyses are usually conceptually framed in terms of 
‘effective connectivity’, which means that statistical relations are construed as (direct) 
influence that one area exerts over another. The term ‘functional connectivity’, on the other 
hand, denotes a mere co-occurrence of activation in different brain regions without inferring 
directional or causal interpretations. The concept of ‘psychophysiological interactions’ (PPIs) 
(Friston et al., 1997) provides a very interesting and valuable statistical approach for the 
investigation of functional integration, according to the authors who developed this approach, 
 
Discussion  78 
in terms of effective connectivity. The basic idea behind PPI analyses is to explain responses 
in one cortical area in terms of an interaction between the influence of another area and some 
experimental (e.g. cognitive or sensational) parameter. In other words, a PPI means that the 
contribution of one area to another area changes significantly with the experimental context, 
i.e. with the required cognitive performance. Future studies may purposefully look for PPIs of 
certain areas that exhibited prominent activation in the current study and thereby may further 
elucidate their functional role or contribution to cognitive control, especially during Stroop 
task performance. For instance, it would be of special relevance to look for connectivity 
patterns of the IFJA during oddball conditions or of the primary somatosensory cortex during 
conditions of motor conflict so as to further elucidate the areas’ contribution to cognitive 
control at the attentional and motor level, respectively. 
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